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A Theory of Vicarious Liability for Autonomous-Machine-Caused Harm
Abstract
The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates doctrinal and theoretical challenges for
assigning tort liability. With emergent capabilities, autonomous machines disrupt the structure of
interpersonal rights and duties in tort law, framed by conditions of foreseeability and proximate
causation. Where algorithmic processes are unintelligible, self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern
goes, algorithmic harms will be untraceable to tortious human agency. As a result, their costs will simply
lie where they fall—on faultless victims. This outcome would be unfair and objectionable: A failure of tort’s
mechanisms of corrective justice means faultless victims would disproportionately bear the accident
costs of autonomous machines. This article suggests that the doctrinal form of vicarious liability is a
promising strategy to ground tort liability for autonomous-machine-caused harm. Human or corporate
deployers should be held liable for tortious harm caused by autonomous machines in the course of
deployment. In this account, autonomous machines constitute a novel legal category as pure legal agents
without legal personhood. In reconceiving vicarious liability—and the legal classification of autonomous
machines—the article seeks to promote commonsensical liability outcomes for autonomous-machinecaused harm, consistent with tort’s doctrinal and theoretical structure of corrective justice.
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A Theory of Vicarious Liability for
Autonomous-Machine-Caused Harm
PINCHAS HUBERMAN*
The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates doctrinal and theoretical
challenges for assigning tort liability. With emergent capabilities, autonomous machines
disrupt the structure of interpersonal rights and duties in tort law, framed by conditions
of foreseeability and proximate causation. Where algorithmic processes are unintelligible,
self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern goes, algorithmic harms will be untraceable
to tortious human agency. As a result, their costs will simply lie where they fall—on faultless
victims. This outcome would be unfair and objectionable: A failure of tort’s mechanisms of
corrective justice means faultless victims would disproportionately bear the accident costs
of autonomous machines.
This article suggests that the doctrinal form of vicarious liability is a promising strategy to
ground tort liability for autonomous-machine-caused harm. Human or corporate deployers
should be held liable for tortious harm caused by autonomous machines in the course of
deployment. In this account, autonomous machines constitute a novel legal category as
pure legal agents without legal personhood. In reconceiving vicarious liability—and the
legal classification of autonomous machines—the article seeks to promote commonsensical
liability outcomes for autonomous-machine-caused harm, consistent with tort’s doctrinal
and theoretical structure of corrective justice.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE are triggering
deployment of autonomous machines, or autonomous agents (AAs), in new
roles, projected to be signifcant parts of our social fabric in coming years
(e.g., driving cars, performing surgeries, caregiving).1 Technological advances
have enabled computer and algorithmic systems to learn from experience by
analyzing large amounts of instructive data at extraordinary speed, and to interact
with their external environments by using sensors and actuators to perform
dynamic physical tasks.2 As a result, we expect increased interaction between
humans and autonomous machines, presenting novel risks of accidental harm
to individuals and property.3 Tere have already been, in this respect, harmful
accidents involving self-driving cars and warehouse robots, resulting in legal

1.

2.
3.

See e.g. Meera Senthilingam, “Would You Let a Robot Perform Your Surgery By Itself?”
(12 May 2016), online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/health/robot-surgeon-boweloperation/index.html>; Adam Goldenberg, “If an Autonomous Vehicle Has an Accident,
Who is Legally Responsible?” (18 December 2018) online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/
opinion/if-an-autonomous-vehicle-has-an-accident-who-is-legally-responsible>; Adriana
Barton, “Cyclons, Tey Are Not. Tese Intelligent and Friendly Robots Are Designed to
Help the Elderly Live a Better Life” (26 August 2018) online: Globe and Mail < www.
theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-ftness/article- cylons-they-are-not-these-intelligentand-friendly-robots-are>; Jacqueline Howard, “Robot Pets Ofer Real Comfort” (1 November
2017) online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2016/10/03/health/robot-pets-loneliness/index.html>.
Jerry Kaplan, Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artifcial
Intelligence (Yale University Press, 2015) at 4-5.
See e.g. Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513 at
534 [Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”].
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suits for personal injury and wrongful death.4 Tese developments raise critical
questions and uncertainty about the scope of human accountability for harms of
autonomous machines using emergent algorithms. Where algorithmic processes
are unintelligible, self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern is that designers
and users will lose full operative control of their outputs and efects, thereby
reducing accountability for resultant accidental harms.5 A growing body of tort
scholarship, in particular, reveals signifcant concern about liability gaps: scholars
worry that suppliers, owners, and users of autonomous machines will too easily
escape liability because of difculties in tracing algorithmic harms to tortious
human agency.6 As a result, victims would disproportionately bear the accident
costs, which is, arguably, an unfair and objectionable liability outcome.
Te possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm, then, generates
signifcant doctrinal and theoretical challenges for assigning tort liability.
Autonomous machines have features that disrupt the structure of interpersonal
rights and duties in tort, which is framed by conditions of foreseeability and
4.

5.

6.

See e.g. Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where
Robots Roam” (19 March 2018) online: New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html>; Peter Holley, “After Crash, Injured Motorcyclist
Accuses Robot-Driven Vehicle of ‘Negligent Driving’” (25 January 2018) online: Washington
Post <www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/01/25/after-crash-injuredmotorcyclist-accuses-robot- driven-vehicle-of-negligent-driving/?utm_term=.ca85154c515e>;
Te Fernandez Firm, “What Happens When a Robot Causes Wrongful Death?” (30 March
2017) online: Medium <medium.com/@thefernandezfrm/what-happens-when-a-robotcauses-wrongful-death-3d1f4f7e9711>; Seth Baum & Trevor White, “When Robots Kill”
(23 July 2015) online: Te Guardian <www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/
jul/23/when-robots-kill>.
See e.g. Andreas Matthias, “Te Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the
Actions of Learning Automata” (2004) 6 Ethics and Information Technology 175; Jack M
Balkin, “Te Tree Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data” (2017) 78 Ohio St LJ 1217
at 1233-34; Frank Pasquale, “Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution,
Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society” (2017) 78 Ohio St LJ 1243 at
1247-55; Madeleine Clare Elish, “Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot
Interaction” (2019) 5 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 40; Alexander Campolo
& Kate Crawford, “Enchanted Determinism: Power Without Responsibility in Artifcial
Intelligence” (2020) 6 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 1.
See e.g. Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3; David C Vladeck,
“Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artifcial Intelligence” (2014) 89 Wash
L Rev 117; Peter M Asaro, “Te Liability Problem for Autonomous Artifcial Agents”
(Association for the Advancement of Artifcial Intelligence 2016 Spring Symposium Series
delivered at the Stanford University, 22 March 2016), (AAAI Press, 2016); Curtis EA
Karnow, “Te Application of Traditional Tort Teory to Embodied Machine Intelligence”
in Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law (Edward Elgar Publishing,
2016) 51 at 74; Jack Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 51-55.
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proximate causation.7 As a general matter, AAs can sense phenomena, process
what they sense, and act upon the world.8 AAs are embodied and emergent:9
As embodied entities, AAs take some corporeal form, are designed to act in
the world, and can directly impact individuals and property.10 As emergent
entities, their behaviours are not entirely pre-programmed. AAs can update
their algorithms through machine learning techniques to efectively adapt
to new circumstances.11 With emergent capabilities, AAs operate with some
degree of functional independence; they are empowered to self-select methods
to achieve programmed goals.12 Tere are, moreover, two dimensions to AAs’
independence. First, AAs’ machine learning capabilities and engagement
with novel circumstances negate full control and foreseeability on the part of
human designers and users.13 Second, through machine learning processes,
AAs’ controlling algorithms are designed by their learning algorithms.14 In this
latter afrmative sense, AAs modify their behaviours through internally caused
processes—a kind of functional agency.15 AAs are still, no doubt, deterministic
systems: their outputs are defned by inputs received.16 AAs’ ultimate goals are
also not their own, but programmed by human designers to advance human
interests. Nevertheless, due to AAs’ emergence, it is exceedingly difcult to
fully trace connections between environmental inputs and changes in their
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

See Pinchas Huberman, “Tort Law, Corrective Justice and the Problem of
Autonomous-Machine-Caused Harm” (2021) 34:1 Can JL & Jur 1 105 at 109-113 (for a
lengthier discussion of AAs’ salient features threatening to disrupt tort law).
See Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 529. Tis is neatly phrased as
the “sense-think-act paradigm.”
Ibid at 532.
Ibid at 534.
Ibid at 538-39. See also Shannon Vallor & George A Bekey, “Artifcial Intelligence and the
Ethics of Self-Learning Robots” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot
Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2017)
338 at 340; Harry Surden, “Machine Learning and Law” (2014) 89 Wash L Rev 87 at 89-95;
Deven R Desai and Joshua A Kroll, “Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law”
(2017) 31 Harv JL & Tech 1 at 26-29; Matthias, supra note 5 at 179.
See Karnow, supra note 6 at 56-60.
Matthias, supra note 5 at 182.
See Desai & Kroll, supra note 11 at 28.
See Ugo Pagallo, Te Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts and Torts (Dordrecht: Springer Science
+ Business Media, 2013) 38; Wolf Loh & Janina Loh, “Autonomy and Responsibility in
Hybrid Systems” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From
Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2017) 39.
See Neil M Richards & William D Smart, “How Should the Law Tink About Robots”
in Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2016) 3 at 18.
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algorithms and behaviours.17 In this sense, AAs are “unpredictable by design.”18
With combined capacities of emergence and embodiment, AAs’ characteristic
unpredictability is coupled with the potential to cause personal injury and
property damage. Even well-trained AAs can produce undesirable outputs in the
real world, including accidental harm.19 While such harm refects misalignment
between AAs’ codes and programmers’ goals, this misalignment may not be
introduced by, or knowable to, programmers themselves.20
Consequently, AAs’ harmful efects may be principally untraceable to
tortious actions of designers, manufacturers, or users.21 If so, under traditional
tort doctrine, the cost of harm resulting from AAs’ emergent behaviours will
simply lie where it falls.22 Under the law of negligence—tort law’s paradigmatic
doctrine in the context of accidents causing personal injury or property
damage—tort liability follows only if the plaintif’s loss is caused by, and within
the scope of, a defendant’s tortious act involving foreseeable and unreasonable
risk to the plaintif.23 If AAs’ emergent processes, outputs, and harmful efects
are typically unforeseeable, it will be difcult to identify tortious conduct by
their designers, manufacturers, or users.24 Moreover, if AAs’ harmful efects stem
from machine-learning algorithms, impacted by variable environmental inputs,
it will be difcult to attribute any particular instance of AA-caused harm to
responsible human conduct as its proximate cause.25 Te harm may be more
precisely attributable to some environmental input, rather than a tortious aspect
of the AA’s design, construction, or operation, if any. Finally, AA-caused harm
is not analogous to common law strict liability categories, such as keeping wild
animals, using explosives, or transporting gasoline. Deploying AAs should
not be viewed as exceedingly dangerous. In some instances, AAs are projected
to be less risky than the human actors they replace. For instance, automated
vehicles will likely be safer than conventional vehicles due to the absence of
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Matthias, supra note 5 at 182.
Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 542.
See Vallor & Bekey, supra note 11 at 343.
Ibid.
See Vladeck, supra note 6 at 121-23.
See Calo, “Robotics and Lessons of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3, 542; Asaro, supra note 6, 191;
Karnow, supra note 6, 63-74; F Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability,
Regulation and Innovation” (2014) 66 Fla L Rev 1803 at 1851-52.
23. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (Te Wagon
Mound), [1961] AC 388.
24. See Karnow, supra note 6 at 74; Pagallo, supra note 15 at 117. See also Karnow, supra note 6
at 63-64, 72-73.
25. See Asaro, supra note 6 at 191-92.
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human-driver-error.26 If deploying AAs is expected to reduce risks associated
with human activities, it should not be characterized as an abnormally dangerous
activity.27 It is dissimilar to keeping wild animals or using explosives, which are
inherently tortious, involving characteristic risk that exceeds the levels normally
assumed in ordinary patterns of interaction.28
Tis doctrinal outcome refects tort law’s theoretical structure of corrective
justice, which does not straightforwardly apply to AA-mediated social
interaction.29 As a practice of corrective justice, tort law assumes a bilateral relation
as its subject: its doctrines determine whether there is a legally relevant link
between a particular defendant’s tortious act and the plaintif’s loss, grounding
the defendant’s agent-specifc duty to repair.30 In the context of personal injury
and property damage, tort liability responds to breaches of qualifed duties of
relational non-injury:31 where wrongful action materializes in loss to an object
of the plaintif’s right. In this view, tort law assumes a relation between two legal
persons situated symmetrically with correlative rights and duties, delineated by
its doctrinal terms of fair interaction. Tort law demarcates the scope of rightful
action with an objective standard of care, setting reciprocal constraints on
individuals’ actions. Acts of risk imposition that exceed an objectively reasonable
level are deemed tortious: Te law evaluates whether individuals’ external actions
are wrongful, in this respect, without judging individuals’ inner-character,
blameworthiness, or subjective lack-of-concern for others.32
Tort liability operates, moreover, only upon the conjunction of wrongful
action and causation. Absent wrongdoing, causation of harm is not a tort: If the
act is consistent with norms of rightful action, the causation of harm does not
26. Bryant Walker Smith, “Automated Driving and Product Liability” (2017) Mich
St L Rev at 15.
27. Ryan Abbott argues, in this respect, that where autonomous machines are safer than their
human counterparts, human actors should be subject to the more exacting standard of a
“reasonable robot,” the purpose of which is to deter the human activity and incentivize
adoption of the preferable automated alternative. See Ryan Abbott, Te Reasonable Robot:
Artifcial Intelligence and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020) at 66-70.
28. For a lengthier doctrinal analysis of AA-caused harm under the laws of negligence and strict
liability, see Huberman, supra note 7 at 122-31.
29. For a more comprehensive presentation of this argument, see ibid at 118-22.
30. See Ernest J Weinrib, Te Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 168-70
[Weinrib, Private Law].
31. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C Zipursky, “Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts”
in Gerald J Postema, ed, Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge University Press,
2001) 214 at 218-20.
32. See OW Holmes, Te Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) at 108.
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infringe upon the plaintif’s right.33 Likewise, absent causation, a wrongful act is
not a tort as, in this instance, there is no interference with an object of a plaintif’s
right at all.34 Te locus of tort liability is wrongful loss, not just any loss sufered
by innocent victims, nor any unreasonable activity undertaken by tortious
actors. Tort liability is, then, concerned with a version of outcome-responsibility:
Liability results from the normative attribution of a plaintif’s loss to a wrongful
action as its legally responsible cause. As a matter of corrective justice, tort law
implicates responsible human agency, grounding agent-specifc liabilities and
duties to rectify harmful efects of wrongful action.35
AA-caused harm does not ft neatly within this basic structure.36 Since AAs
are not legal subjects bearing tort duties, harm resulting from AAs’ emergent
processes—i.e., processes which are not traceable to tortious programming,
instruction, or manipulation by human designers or users—does not stem
from pertinent legal agency. AA-caused harm, in this sense, seems to be legally
comparable to natural-events-causing harm, which leaves victims without an
avenue for compensation in tort. Tis outcome refects a traditional application
of tort law, which evaluates whether particular instances of AA-caused harm are
legally attributable to human tortious conduct—whether negligent use or design.
However, this traditional analysis implicitly views AAs as ordinary products,
and fails to adequately grasp the distinctive character of AA-mediated social
relations. AAs are expected to perform tasks previously undertaken exclusively
by humans—e.g., driving cars, performing surgeries, caregiving—with some
functional independence. AAs’ social signifcance is not entirely analogous to
ordinary products: AAs act on environmental inputs that are not traceable to
particular human designers or users, and their outward efects are not necessarily
attributable to human agency, as the efects of products typically are. But
AA-caused harm is also not morally equivalent to natural-events-causing harm:
Unlike natural disasters, AAs are purposely deployed by humans to advance
their interests. AAs have special social and normative signifcance, as mediators
of human interaction: Tey are deployed by individuals and corporations to
independently perform complex tasks in interaction with other individuals and
property. AAs’ special utility and functional independence suggest that they are
33. Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in Private Law” (2010) 60
UTLJ 731 at 766-70.
34. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Harvard University Press, 2016) at 116.
35. Jules L Coleman, “Te Practice of Corrective Justice” in David G Owen, ed, Philosophical
Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 53 at 66-69.
36. For a lengthier discussion of the argument in this paragraph and the next, see Huberman,
supra note 7 at 121-22, 135-37.
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better regarded as quasi-social-actors, extraordinary entities without self-evident
legal classifcation.
Construing AAs as (functional) actors reveals a critical insight: Tere is no tort
liability for AA-caused harm under negligence or strict liability because distributors
or users are not the relevant actors that cause the harm—AAs were deployed
to perform the tasks instead. Tese doctrines do not capture the relevance of
(reasonable) deployment of another actor to perform a task as grounds for liability.
A formalistic application of tort law, then, leads to a fundamental incongruity:
Whereas personally performing tasks causing accidental harm could potentially
produce tort liability, individuals can avoid liability altogether by deploying AAs
to perform the tasks instead. And, in turn, the emergent and harmful efects of
AAs fall outside the realm of tort law as they are not legal subjects. Tis liability
outcome, however, does not capture the normative signifcance of distributing
or using AAs, which entails an uncontrollable potential of harm, at least in
isolated cases. Since deployers utilize AAs’ emergent features to advance their
purposes, they should assume some responsibility for AA-caused harm—in the
agent-specifc sense, as a matter of tort law—despite reduced foreseeability and
proximate causation. Tis demands creative use of tort categories and potentially
reconceiving AAs’ legal classifcation to evaluate AAs’ proper normative impact
on the rights and duties of legal persons.
To this end, this article considers the doctrinal form of vicarious liability for
AA-caused harm: whether deployers (users or distributors) of AAs may be liable
for tortious acts committed by AAs in the course of deployment.37 It argues that
a vicarious liability approach ofers a pragmatic doctrinal solution that rests on
plausible theoretical foundations. In this account, AAs’ outward behaviours would
be evaluated as tortious or non-tortious. AAs commit torts where their outward
behaviours fail to conform to standards of care expected of reasonable persons
in the circumstances. Vicarious liability then attaches to defendant deployers
for tortious acts of AAs that occur in the course of deployment, circumventing
the need to trace AA-caused harm to tortious conduct by deployers themselves
(i.e., negligent use or legally defective design). Te solution is a pragmatic one:
It is a way to discover a basis of liability despite AAs’ functional independence
and characteristic unpredictability, which prevents direct attribution of AAs’
emergent processes, outputs, and harmful efects to human agency. It is also
conceptually plausible and normatively sound: It refects deployers’ agent-specifc

37. Te deployers, for the purposes of vicarious liability, may be users or distributors, as discussed
in Part III(D), below.
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responsibility for deploying functionally independent and instrumentally rational
actors to perform tasks entailing the distinctive risks of AA-caused harm.
Te move to vicarious liability for AA-caused harm is certainly controversial.
It implies that AAs are legal actors capable of committing torts that can be
imputed to human principals. At the core of the vicarious liability account is a
legal stance toward AAs that is analogous to employees or legal agents: AAs act on
behalf of human or corporate deployers, empowered to ground deployers’ liability
for their tortious harms occurring in the course of deployment. Tis approach
generates fresh doctrinal and theoretical complications to be addressed in this
article: What is the method to evaluate AAs’ actions as tortious or non-tortious?
What is the method to determine whether AAs’ tortious actions are sufciently
connected to their deployment to impute their tortious acts to their deployers?
How does the agency relation between AAs and their deployers arise? Can AAs
be coherently compared to employees for purposes of tort liability, though they
are not legal persons?
Tis article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the doctrinal elements of
common law vicarious liability: a tort, committed by an employee, in the course
of employment. It focuses, specifcally, on the doctrinal role of enterprise risk,
which forms the requisite link between employees’ torts and their employers,
grounding vicarious liability. Part II provides a conceptual account of vicarious
liability, consistent with its doctrinal confguration and tort law’s basic structure,
which embodies agent-specifc reasons for liability. In this account, vicarious
liability refects employers’ and employees’ joint production of, and joint
responsibility for, tortious harm. Where an employee’s tortious act is linked to
risks of enterprise, the act is also attributable to the employer: Since the employer
enterprise is identifed with the employee’s tortious act, it is deemed an additional
responsibility base. In this view, vicarious liability grounds agent-specifc reasons
for liability specifcally suited to employment relations in which employers and
employees act jointly in pursuit of collective aims of enterprise. Tis account lays
the foundation for conceiving of AA deployment as a form of legal agency—akin
to employment—as elaborated upon in the following section.
Part III extends the doctrinal elements of vicarious liability to the context of
AA-caused harm. AAs are deemed to be legal actors pursuant to a legal intentional
stance, with capacity to commit tortious acts. AAs’ tortious acts are then
attributable to their deployers when committed in the course of deployment—
that is, when linked to characteristic deployment risk—which grounds deployers’
vicarious liability. A distinctive theoretical conception of legal agency is at
play in the vicarious liability account: AAs are pure legal agents without legal
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personhood. AAs can therefore give efect to legal consequences for deployers,
but not on their own account. Tis article argues that a pure legal agency
classifcation nicely captures AAs’ social and normative position within human
relations, as functionally independent and rational instrumentalities deployed
to act exclusively for deployers’ purposes. Te pure legal agency classifcation
emphasizes the legal signifcance of the deployment relation as a whole—not
AAs’ independent legal or moral status—implicating deployers’ responsibility for
AAs’ outputs and harmful efects.
Tis account, moreover, is illuminated by philosophical accounts that
perceive sophisticated technologies as extending human agency. Drawing on the
philosophy of technology scholarship of Deborah Johnson and F. Allan Hanson,
it argues that AAs’ tortious acts cannot be dissociated from their deployment and
its characteristic risks. AAs’ tortious acts committed in the course of deployment
should stand in as surrogates to evaluate deployers’ responsibility in tort. Crucially,
this article does not endorse any specifc position about AAs’ metaphysical or
moral status. It also does not insinuate that AAs have independent legal status:
their normative impact on rights and duties of legal persons is intrinsically tied
to the deployment relation as a whole—the deployment risk—implicating
deployers’ responsibility, not their own.
Part IV sketches the relation between pure legal agency and ordinary legal
agency, which is constituted by two legal persons. Drawing on Lionel Smith’s
interpretation of fduciary duties, it identifes a core idea of legal agency applicable
to AAs: Legal agency refects a social relation whereby one actor acts exclusively
for the interests of another. It also highlights two fundamental aspects of legal
agency that are absent in AA deployment. Te frst is that agency relations are
typically formed by mutual assent of agent and principal. Te second is that
central to agency relations are fduciary duties owed by agents to their principals.
Te article concludes by ofering a way to think about these doctrinal
requirements in the context of AAs. It argues that mutual assent and fduciary
duties are necessary to constitute legal agency relations specifcally where legal
agents are also legal persons with their own subjective frst-personal interests. Since
AAs are not legal persons, but sophisticated instrumentalities, they inherently
occupy a social role akin to legal agents: Tey are deployed to act exclusively for
deployers’ purposes, and lack subjective interests of their own, rendering doctrinal
requirements of mutual assent and fduciary duties redundant. While only a
preliminary sketch, the pure legal agency account plausibly grounds deployers’
vicarious liability as a matter of tort law, or so the argument goes.
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Before continuing further, I must address, albeit briefy, the reasons for
undertaking doctrinal analysis of AA-caused harm, and particularly, in the form
of vicarious liability. One may reasonably object to this approach: Te perspective
of tort doctrine is too narrow to confront challenges posed by cutting-edge
technology. It is preferable, the objection goes, to concentrate on identifying
legitimate policy goals—e.g., to incentivize innovation, establish consumer-safety
product-design standards, deter cost-inefcient and unsafe product design,
reduce or widely-spread accident costs, compensate innocent victims—and to
craft regulatory schemes to promote them.38 I concede that this criticism is sound:
Tese policy objectives could be implemented through regulatory schemes to
distribute fairly the benefts and burdens of AAs, including their accident costs.
It is also possible that specifc industries—e.g., healthcare, transportation—will
be subject to liability schemes that compensate accident victims.39 Te advantage
of sidestepping tort law is clear: It avoids doctrines embodying notions of
corrective justice and outcome responsibility, which have confusing application
in the context of deploying emergent AAs which may cause accidental harm.
Nevertheless, there is reason to undertake common law tort analyses of
AA-caused harm. First, tort analyses disclose legal options for policymakers
to consider. Since legislative liability schemes may be modelled upon existing
common law doctrines—though, perhaps, with modifcation—rigorous doctrinal
analysis can reveal potential regulatory approaches, thereby contributing to the
legislative process. Second, it is important to have a common law jurisprudence
for AA-caused harm (alongside alternative liability schemes) if deployment of AAs
becomes commonplace. Common law principles of general application will be
necessary for cases of AA-caused harm that are not subject to specifc regulatory
schemes, and courts will look to tort law for a doctrinal resolution to the problem
of AA-caused harm. Tird, tort law embodies distinctive norms of interpersonal
38. For scholarly approaches that identify these policy concerns and consider tort and other
regulatory schemes and standards to promote them, see e.g., Mark A Geistfeld, “A Roadmap
for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety
Regulations” (2017) 105 Calif L Rev 1611; Hubbard, supra note 22; Kenneth S Abraham &
Robert L Rabin, “Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New
Legal Regime for a New Era” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 127.
39. For instance, Kenneth Abraham and Robert Rabin propose a new compensation regime,
termed Manufacturers Enterprise Responsibility (MER), for victims of autonomous
vehicles. MER would operate as a third-party insurance system funded by manufacturers of
autonomous vehicles to compensate accident victims without resort to proof of negligence
or product liability. It would be an exclusive remedy, replacing victims’ rights to sue in
tort. See Kenneth S Abraham & Robert L Rabin, “Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 127.
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responsibility, which provide a worthy contribution to scholarly work on the
ethics of artifcial intelligence and robotics. Tort doctrines and principles are
normatively rich, ofering insight into questions about risk, wrongdoing, and
causation. Tort theory, then, contributes to ethical refection about accountability
for supplying and using emergent AAs that cause accidental harm. In addition
to ofering concrete doctrinal solutions, tort analyses should constitute part of
the growing philosophical and ethical literature on artifcial intelligence and
robotics. Finally, tort analyses of AA-caused harm have self-standing value as an
exercise in tort theory: to refect upon tort law’s applicability in the context of
AA-mediated social relations. In contrast to the previous three reasons—relating
to tort’s contribution to resolving social and ethical problems of AA-caused
harm—this fourth reason underscores that AA-caused harm is problematic for
tort law. Tort law is concerned with a kind of interpersonal injustice—linking
a plaintif’s loss to a particular defendant’s tortious action—that may be simply
irrelevant in the context of AA-mediated interaction. Te concern is that
emergent AAs—functionally independent, non-legal subjects—render tort law’s
internal normative viewpoint inapplicable. Tort analysis of AA-caused harm,
in this respect, is important for its own sake: to study tort law, its proper scope,
and its limits.
But these reasons take us only so far. Te critic may still argue that this article’s
vicarious liability or pure legal agency approach is too extreme a reconception
of tort law. Instead, the argument would go, it is preferable to make modest
adjustments for which there is some historical precedent, such as reducing causation
standards or plaintifs’ burden of proof, or embracing strict products liability.40
My contention, nonetheless, is that any modifcation to tort law must address
the fundamental issue of fair interpersonal conduct with respect to deploying
AAs. Reduced-fault modifcations, however, point toward alternative liability
schemes; such fxes muddle the reasoned basis of agent-specifc liability in tort.
Absent notions of wrongful interpersonal conduct and outcome responsibility,
tort’s narrow focus on particular bilateral interactions between defendants and
plaintifs is unfair, preventing losses from being shared by all similarly situated
enterprise participants benefting from the relevant activity causing harm.
Tese reduced-fault fxes also respond inadequately to the advent of emergent
AAs, continuing to treat them as ordinary products. A doctrinal resolution is
better served by thinking carefully about AAs’ salient features—including their

40. Tese alternative modifcations of tort are addressed, for instance, in Hubbard, supra
note 22 at 1852.
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extraordinary roles as functionally independent and rational instruments—that
disrupt the structure of interpersonal rights and duties in tort.41
Te pure legal agency or vicarious liability account is valuable for this
reason: It ofers a legal conception of AAs that captures their salient features and
guides sound tort liability outcomes. My argument is that vicarious liability is a
suitable doctrinal form to evaluate tort liability for AA-caused harm: It provides
agent-specifc grounds for liability specifcally appropriate to the AA-deployment
relation. My aim, in this sense, is to fnd coherence, in refective equilibrium,
between tort principles, the morality of corrective justice, and commonsensical
liability outcomes for AA-caused harm.

I. THE COMMON LAW OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Under the modern formulation of vicarious liability, employers are liable for
torts committed by employees in the course of employment.42 In this respect,
vicarious liability has three doctrinal elements.43 First, an employee commits a
tort. Te foundation of vicarious liability is the employee’s tortious causation of
harm. Liability is then broadened by imposing it on an additional defendant, the
employer.44 For this reason, an employer who is liable under vicarious liability
typically has a right to indemnity from the employee, the tortious actor.45
Second, the person committing the tort is an employee of the defendant.46
Tere is no conclusive test to determine whether a person is an employee rather
than an independent contractor.47 Te central question is whether the person
engaged to perform services does so as a servant for the employer, or whether the
person acts independently “as a person in business on his own account.”48 Several
factors assist this determination: the level of control the employer has over the
worker’s activities; whether the worker provides his own equipment or hires his
own helpers; the degree of fnancial risk, investment and management held by
41. See Jack B Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 47-48.
42. See Ernest J Weinrib, Tort Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed (Emond Publishing, 2014) at
610 [Weinrib, Tort Law].
43. Ibid.
44. William Lloyd Prosser and Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th (West
Group, 1984) at 499.
45. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co v Lister, [1957] AC 555 [Lister]; London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne
& Nagel International Ltd, [1992] 3 SCR 299 [London Drugs].
46. See Weinrib, Tort Law, supra note 42 at 610.
47. 671122 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc, 2001 SCC 59 at paras 46-48.
48. Ibid at para 47.

246

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

the worker; and the worker’s opportunity for proft in the activity.49 Tere are
also exceptional instances where vicarious liability extends to acts of independent
contractors, such as where employers have non-delegable duties of care or where
the work is especially dangerous.50
Tird, the employee’s tort is committed in the course of employment. In the
doctrinal language, this requirement excludes torts committed while the employee
is “on a frolic of his own,” but includes torts committed while the defendant’s
“deviation from the prescribed task can be construed merely as a detour.”51 Even
unauthorized or prohibited conduct can be construed as being in the course of
employment if it is rightly regarded as a mode—albeit an improper one—of
carrying out authorized acts of business.52
Te function of vicarious liability is to hold employers responsible for tortious
acts of employees that relate to characteristic risks of enterprise.53 Te critical
analysis is whether an employee’s tortious act is, in some sense, characteristic of
and attributable to a risk created by the enterprise. Te doctrinal signifcance of
enterprise risks can be seen in the seminal case Ira S Bushey.54 In that case, a drunk
employee of the United States Cost Guard negligently turned wheels on a drydock
wall, for no apparent reason, causing the ship to fall against, and damage, the
drydock. Although the employee’s tortious act did not have explicit purpose to
serve the employer, the Court held the defendant government vicariously liable
for the employee’s negligent act. Te Court stated that vicarious liability rests
in a “deeply rooted sentiment” that a business enterprise should be responsible
for tortious accidents that are characteristic of its activities.55 An enterprise is
liable for employees’ tortious acts that relate to risks inherent in the ongoing
activities of the enterprise. Importantly, however, since vicarious liability
attaches to general ongoing risk of enterprise, an employee’s particular tortious
act need not be foreseeable to the employer as a real and substantial risk in the
negligence sense. In Ira S Bushey, the Court found that the employee’s negligent
action—though not specifcally foreseeable, nor aimed at a legitimate business
rationale—was still part of the seafaring activity as it took place on the ship while
attending to seafaring matters.56 Since the seafaring enterprise employed seamen
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Ibid.
See Weinrib, Tort Law, supra note 42 at 616.
Ibid.
Canadian Pacifc Railway v Lockhart, [1941] SCR 278 at paras 9, 12.
Ira S Bushey & Sons, Inc v United States, 398 F 2d 167 (2nd Cir 1968) [Bushey].
Ibid.
Ibid at 171.
Ibid at 172.

HUBERMAN, AUTONOMOUS-MACHINE-CAUSED HARM 247

who recurrently cross the drydock while drunk, potential tortious damage to the
drydock was viewed as a risk inherent to the seafaring enterprise. By contrast, the
Court noted, if the employee had damaged property on the street while walking
to the ship, the incident would have related to his domestic life, not his seafaring
activity, and liability would not extend to the enterprise itself.57
More recently, in a series of cases dealing with vicarious liability for sexual
assault committed by employees, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) afrmed
the centrality of enterprise risk to vicarious liability. In Bazley v. Curry, the Court
held that a defendant non-proft organization operating a residential care facility
was vicariously liable for its employee’s sexual assault of children in its care.58
Justice McLachlin, writing for the court, stated that employers are vicariously
liable for unauthorized tortious acts of employees that fall within the ambit of
risk that the enterprise creates or exacerbates.59 Te question of vicarious liability,
then, concerns whether there is a sufcient nexus between the enterprise’s risk
and the employee’s subsequent tort.60 To ground vicarious liability, the enterprise
needs to materially enhance the risk of tortious harm by putting the employee
in a position conducive to preforming the tortious act.61 Tis involves more than
merely creating an opportunity for the tortious act, or being a but-for cause of
the tortious act.62 Yet, the enterprise risk does not need to be a foreseeable and
substantial risk of the particular kind of resulting harm in the negligence sense.
Enterprise risk is not tortious risk; it does not ground the tortious causation of
harm itself. Rather, the doctrinal function of enterprise risk is to link employees’
tortious causation of harm—whether negligence or intentional tort—to distinct
risk inherent to the enterprise as a whole.63 Te determination of vicarious
liability turns on judging the strength of the connection between employees’
tortious acts and risks of enterprise. Vicarious liability captures instances where
risks of enterprise could be seen to produce employees’ tortious acts. In Justice
McLachlin’s words, “it must be possible to say that the employer signifcantly
increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position
and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks.”64 Te employment of the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Ibid.
Bazley v Curry, [1999] 2 SCR 534 [Bazley].
Ibid at para 37.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 39.
Ibid at para 42 [emphasis in original].
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tortious actor must signifcantly increase the risk of the kind of tortious harm
that ultimately ensues.
In Bazley, the defendant care facility was vicariously liable for the sexual
assault committed by its employee, as it materially increased the risk of sexual
assault. Te defendant care facility provided its employee with opportunity for
intimate private control—a parental relationship—over children in its care. Te
incidents of abuse were the “product of the special relationship of intimacy and
respect the employer fostered, as well as the special opportunities for exploitation
of that relationship it furnished.”65 By contrast, in Jacobi v. Grifths, a companion
case to Bazley, the SCC held that a defendant non-proft club providing group
recreational activities for children was not vicariously liable for sexual assault
committed by its program director.66 In Jacobi, the opportunity that the club
provided the program director for abuse was slight, as its activities were public,
occurring in groups, and in the presence of volunteers.67 Te sexual abuse was
possible only because the program director “subverted the public nature of
the activities,” enticing children to his home.68 According to the Court, the
director’s tortious acts were insufciently related to risks of enterprise, which
merely provided the director opportunity to work with children in public and
non-intimate settings. Likewise, several years later, in E.B. v. Order of the Oblates,
the SCC held that a defendant residential school was not vicariously liable for
sexual assault committed by its maintenance employee.69 Te Court found that
the employee’s duties did not include authority to be in situations of intimacy
with students, nor to be alone with them.70 While the residential school increased
students’ vulnerability in a general sense, there was no specifc or enhanced risk
due to employing the particular tort-committing-employee in his particular
position to perform his assigned tasks.71
Accordingly, the critical point of analysis is whether an employee’s tortious
act can be traced to a distinct risk in employing the tortious actor. Vicarious
liability refects a particular kind of relation between the enterprise and the
ensuing tortious act: Te tortious act relates to a characteristic risk of enterprise
in employing the tortious actor in a particular position to perform assigned
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Ibid at para 58.
Jacobi v Grifths, [1999] 2 SCR 570.
Ibid at para 80.
Ibid.
EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in the Province of British
Columbia, 2005 SCC 60.
70. Ibid at para 48.
71. Ibid.
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tasks. If this relation is present, unauthorized tortious acts are viewed as having
been committed in the course of employment, and the employer is vicariously
liable. Since the tortious act is committed in the course of employment, the
act is deemed in law to have been committed on the employer’s behalf, and the
employer is seen to have (jointly) produced it. Te tortious act is then legally
attributable to the employer, grounding vicarious liability.
In this account, the notion of enterprise risk lies at the doctrinal core of
vicarious liability. Tis is not to deny that there are also several policy goals
purportedly advanced by vicarious liability.72 Te frst is compensation: Plaintifs
gain compensatory access to an entity that is more likely to be fnancially capable
of satisfying a judgment (i.e., the employer enterprise with deeper pockets than its
employees). Te second is deterrence: Vicarious liability incentivizes employers to
carefully select, train, and supervise employees, and to discipline employees who
act wrongfully. Te third is enterprise liability: Since enterprises advance their
economic interests through assigning employment tasks to employees, it is fair
to require enterprises to internalize the costs of torts committed by employees in
the course of employment. Te fnal policy rationale is loss spreading: Enterprises
are generally in good position to obtain liability insurance and spread its costs
to consumers through higher prices. Nevertheless, the imposition of vicarious
liability still depends on a particular doctrinal confguration constituted by
enterprise risk: In the absence of the right kind of relation between the enterprise
risk and the ensuing tortious act, there is no vicarious liability, even if some of the
policy goals could still be advanced.
In Bazley, the SCC emphasized that vicarious liability provides a fair means
of compensating victims because the enterprise created the risk resulting in
tortious conduct.73 It also cautioned that if employees’ tortious acts are not related
to enterprise risk, imposing vicarious liability would wrongly reduce employers
to being involuntary insurers, without suitably implicating the deterrence
rationale.74 In this way, the Court tied the compensation and deterrence policies
to the doctrinal requirement of enterprise risk. Te notion of enterprise risk is,
then, the principled basis in tort to extend liability to employers for tortious harm
committed by employees. It draws a link between the employee’s tortious act and
the employer’s risk of employing the tortious actor to perform an assigned task.
While vicarious liability may advance various social goals, such as compensation,

72. London Drugs, supra note 45, La Forest J.
73. Bazley, supra note 58 at paras 29-31.
74. Ibid at para 36.
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deterrence, enterprise liability, or loss spreading, it only does so if the doctrinal
requirement of enterprise risk is satisfed.

II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
As a practice of corrective justice, tort liability follows only if the plaintif’s loss is
legally caused by a particular defendant’s tortious act, grounding the defendant’s
agent-specifc liability and duty to repair. Te doctrine of vicarious liability
appears, at frst glance, to be inconsistent with this liability structure, as employers
are liable for the unauthorized tortious acts of employees, without tortious
conduct of their own. It is true that vicarious liability is still rooted in employees’
actionable torts; it merely extends liability to employers where the torts are tied
to risks of enterprise. However, this extension of liability to employers needs to
be examined, as it obligates employers to repair plaintifs’ losses even though the
risks of enterprise are not tortious, per se. Employers are then liable for losses they
did not wrongfully cause. Perhaps, then, vicarious liability is an exception to the
general principle that defendants’ agent-specifc liability attaches to their own
tortious causation of harm.
Tere are three general ways to conceptualize employers’ vicarious
liability for unauthorized tortious acts committed by employees in the course
of employment.75 Te frst conception is that employers are burdened with
the liability costs of tortious acts, though they are not the responsible actors.
Vicarious liability, in this view, is a re-distribution of liability costs to employers
who are, purportedly, the optimal cost-bearers.76 It is not, however, a judgment
about wrongful loss or outcome responsibility. As noted above, there are several
policy rationales that partially explain the re-distribution of liability costs:
compensation, deterrence, enterprise liability, and loss-spreading.
My contention, however, is that vicarious liability can be explained
consistently with tort’s structure of corrective justice. Te key to make sense
of this, arguably, is the doctrinal notion of enterprise risk; it suggests that
vicarious liability responds to employers’ special (agent-specifc) responsibility
75. Te three conceptions—whether vicarious liability is a mere distribution of liability costs to
employers, or refects a composite identity of employer-acting-through-employee, or fnally,
whether it refects an attribution of the employee’s tortious act to the employer, may be
represented, respectively, by the approaches of Guido Calabresi, Ernest Weinrib, and Robert
Stevens. See Guido Calabresi, “Some Toughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts”
(1961) 70 Yale LJ 499, at 543-45; Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 30 at 186-87; and Robert
Stevens, Torts and Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 259-62.
76. See e.g. Calabresi, supra note 75, at 543.
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for the ensuing tort. Since it tracks enterprise risk, vicarious liability conveys
that employers are, in some sense, outcome responsible for the tortious harm.
Tis brings us to a second conception of vicarious liability: that the extension of
liability to employers is actually a judgement about employers’ tortious causation
of harm.77 Ernest Weinrib reasons, in this regard, that the agency relation between
employers and employees afrms a legally constructed composite identity of
employer-acting-through-employee: Since the employee is a mere cog in the
enterprise, the employee’s tortious act is an extended act of the enterprise as a
whole.78 Weinrib refers to this “composite” doer of harm as a “more inclusive legal
persona,” a legal fction without empirical reality, refecting law’s construction of
its own normative reality.79 In this view, the employer is viewed as a tortious actor
and liable as a matter corrective justice: Vicarious liability constructs a normative
link between employer and victim, since the employee’s tortious act is simply
the act of the employer, as its principal. However, if an employee’s tortious act is
unauthorized, vicarious liability follows only if the proper relation between the
tortious act and the enterprise is established, so that the employee is regarded
as having acted as part of the enterprise.80 Tis is the central role of enterprise
risk: It establishes the requisite relation between the employee’s tortious act and
the enterprise—in which the employment itself produces risk of the particular
tortious act—to attribute the tortious act to the enterprise despite its apparent
non-authorization. If this relation is present, the employer is legally viewed as the
tortious actor—that is, as having wrongfully caused the plaintif’s loss, grounding
its agent-specifc duty to repair.
However, there is a worthy counter-argument to this composite-doer
theory: It largely collapses the distinct roles of employees and employers in
causing tortious harm. Te law distinguishes between their respective roles,
as employers may seek indemnity from employees who cause unauthorized
tortious harm in the course of business.81 If employers are actually the tortious
actors and employees’ identities collapse as mere cogs in the enterprise, as the
composite-doer conception suggests, it is illogical to legally empower employers
to seek indemnity for their own tortious acts.

77.
78.
79.
80.

Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 30 at 186-87.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self ” (1992) 105 Harv L
Rev 959 at 981-82.
81. Lister, supra note 45; London Drugs, supra note 45.
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Te assumption in this counter-argument is sound: As between employees
and employers, the employees are the actual tortious actors. Employers may,
therefore, seek indemnity from employees for unauthorized torts committed in the
course of employment. At the same time, the employment relation has additional
signifcance, in which employees act as extensions of the enterprise. Tis refects a
two-fold legal signifcance of employment relations. On the one hand, employees
are independent legal actors, subjects of potential personal liability to victims or
indemnity to employers for their tortious acts. On the other hand, employees act
to advance their employers’ purposes, not their own. Due to this latter feature,
employees’ tortious acts may be sufciently tied to tasks of employment, and
so attributable to the enterprise itself. Tis two-fold signifcance results in a
multi-layered system of responsibility: As independent tortious actors, employees
may be liable to indemnify employers for unauthorized torts committed in the
course of employment. Simultaneously, employees’ tortious acts are attributable
to employers with respect to victims outside the employment relation.
Tis analysis suggests a third possible conception of vicarious liability,
which features a subtle distinction between the tortious action and the tortious
actor. While the employee is the tortious actor (the employer commits no
initial tortious action), vicarious liability attributes the employee’s tortious act
to the employer vis-à-vis the plaintif.82 Tis framing gives rise to a further
question: if the employer is not the actual tortious actor, why is the tortious
action attributed to the employer? It relates, arguably, to a notion of collective
or associational responsibility stemming from the social arrangement of
employment: an employee’s act also belongs to the employer when they act in a
common pursuit.83 Tis is the doctrinal role of enterprise risk: It links employees’
unauthorized tortious acts to tasks of employment, and thereby, to the common
pursuit of enterprise with which the employer is socially-identifed. Te employer
82. Robert Stevens maintains that vicarious liability involves an attribution of the employees’
tortious act to the employer, not merely the liability. See Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights,
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at 259-62.
83. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 80 at 985-86. As an illustration of collective responsibility, Meir
Dan-Cohen ofers the example of a team, where individual members use the frst-person
plural pronoun “we” to claim responsibility for acts of (other members of ) the team, even if
they did not play in the particular game. Te collective team identity permits the attribution
of acts by some individual members to other individual members. Te attribution of the
act—and responsibility for the act—exists by virtue of a shared identifcation with the
collective team identity. Tis provides insight into vicarious liability: since the employer
and employee share a common identity, defned by the pursuit of enterprise, the tortious
actions of an employee—though acting alone and unauthorized—may be attributable to the
employer where sufciently linked to the pursuit of enterprise.
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is then an additional individual responsibility base (i.e., in addition to the
employee) for tortious harm occurring in the pursuit of enterprise.
Tis third conception of vicarious liability—refecting employers’
identifcation with, and associational responsibility for, employees’ tortious
acts—is, in my view, consistent with tort’s basic structure of agent-specifc
liability. Tort liability involves a normative attribution of a plaintif’s loss to a
defendant’s tortious act, as its legal cause. Vicarious liability involves this kind of
normative attribution, but in way that is distinctly suitable to the employment
context. It forms a particular legal construction of the employment relation:
In cases of vicarious liability, employers and employees are seen to participate
interdependently to produce tortious harm—that is, to jointly cause the
tortious harm.84 As a result, the law empowers plaintifs with recourse against
two defendants, employer and employee. In this way, the law recognizes the
interdependence of employee and employer with respect to the commission of
the tort: While the employee commits the completed tortious act, the potential
for the tortious act was created by the employment itself. Tis does not mean the
law construes the employer and employee as a single composite-doer-of-harm.
Rather, the employer and employee are independent legal actors who jointly
produce tortious harm, for which they are independent responsibility bases.
Teir joint production of tortious harm is not identical. While the tortious act is
committed by the employee, it is also normatively attributable to the employer
(vis-à-vis the plaintif) due to the employer’s self-identifcation with the employee’s
employment tasks, which comprise part of the collective goals of enterprise.85
Te law, then, continues to view the employee as the tortious actor, and the
employee is indeed a defendant in an immediate tort relation with the plaintif,
and also potentially required to indemnify the employer. However, the tortious
action also belongs to the employer, since it occurred in the course of employment
with which the employer is inescapably associated. In this view, vicarious liability
is not a re-allocation of liability costs to promote external policy goals. It refects
an employer’s special responsibility for the wrongful loss, due to its legal association
and identifcation with the tortious action: Te tortious causation of harm also
belongs to the employer. Tis is a legal interpretation of the employment relation,
where employers materially enhance the risk of employees committing specifc
torts by providing a particular employment opportunity. While the foundation
of liability remains the employee’s tortious act, liability is then extended to the
84. Bazley, supra note 58 at para 19.
85. On liability refecting self-identifcation of an actor with a tortious action, see Dan-Cohen,
supra note 80 at 981-86.
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employer, who is responsible for associated acts of employees relating to the
common pursuit of enterprise.
In this account, vicarious liability does not simply re-distribute liability
costs of employees’ tortious accidents to employers; rather, it attributes employees’
tortious acts to employers. It does so by implicating the employment itself in
the joint-production of tortious harm, drawing a normative link between the
employee’s tortious act and the risks of employment. If employment materially
enhances the risk of the ensuing tort, the tortious act is sufciently linked to
the enterprise, despite being unauthorized. Te tortious harm is then attributed
to both components of the collectivity of enterprise, empowering the plaintif
to seek repair from two responsibility bases, employer and employee. Since the
tortious act is also attributed to the enterprise itself, the employer could have an
agent-specifc obligation to repair the plaintif’s loss.
In sum, vicarious liability refects a special legal relation between employers
and employees. Te employment relation recognizes the interdependence of
employees and employers, as joint-producers of tortious harm while carrying
out aims of enterprise. As independent legal actors, employees may be liable
to victims (and employers) for torts committed in the course of employment.
At the same time, vis-à-vis plaintifs, employees’ tortious acts are also legally
attributable to employers. Tis layered liability outcome refects employees’
status as independent legal persons employed to act for the collective purposes
of enterprise. It triggers liability consequences for employers who are, then,
additional responsibility bases for tortious acts of the enterprise.

III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND AA-CAUSED HARM
To review, the doctrinal problem of AA-caused harm refects the problematic
nature of AAs’ social roles as mediators of human interaction. Emergent AAs
are anticipated to perform tasks with a degree of functional independence. Te
normative signifcance of AAs’ outward efects is not simply analogous to those
of ordinary products. Since AAs are stimulated by environmental feedback, their
efects are not necessarily traceable to human input. AA’s outward efects are also
not analogous to those of natural events, since AAs are deliberately deployed
by humans for human purposes. AAs are, then, more like functional actors.
As noted above, the laws of negligence and strict liability likely decline liability
for AA-caused harm because users or distributors are not the relevant actors that
cause the harm; AAs were deliberately deployed to perform the tasks instead.
Since human distributors or users of AAs commit no initial tortious act, they are
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not exposed to liability. Tese doctrines do not capture, as potential grounds for
liability, the relevance of (reasonably) deploying another actor to perform a task.
Te doctrinal form of vicarious liability, however, ofers a promising
solution to the problem of AA-caused harm, as it captures a form of associational
responsibility for employing, or deploying, another actor to perform assigned
tasks that increase risk of specifc kinds of tortious harm. Victims of AA-caused
harm should aim at this argument: Deployment of AAs involves characteristic
risk of misalignment and AA-caused harm, analogous to human employment
that provides special opportunity for employees to commit specifc kinds of
torts related to their tasks of employment. While deployment of AAs may not
be unreasonably risky in the negligence sense, it involves characteristic risk of
misalignment and AA-caused harm. It is comparable to employing human
employees, which is not unreasonably risky in the negligence sense, but increases
risks of tortious harm committed by employees. Notably, both human employees
and AAs perform tasks to advance the goals of their employers and deployers,
not their own. Moreover, both employers of human employees and deployers
of AAs lack full operative control: Human employees can commit unauthorized
tortious acts, and AAs’ functional independence risks undesirable misalignment
and AA-caused harm. Accordingly, the argument goes, just as employers are seen
to jointly-produce their employees’ tortious harm committed in the course of
employment, so too should deployers of AAs be seen to jointly-produce AAs’
tortious harm committed in the course of deployment.
Tis doctrinal solution is certainly controversial: it implicitly regards AAs as
actors, rather than mere products. Critics may reasonably object to classifying
inanimate artifacts as actors. In their view, automated vehicles or surgical robots
are sophisticated tools, not more. Since AAs lack autonomy, intentional states, and
consciousness, the argument goes, the analogy to human employees—legal and
moral agents—is fctitious and potentially misleading. While employees’ actions
can give efect to legal consequences—for both themselves and employers—AAs
do not act at all. To attribute legal consequences to AAs’ tortious actions, then,
is an artifcial and misconceived fction.
In truth, the assumption in this criticism is sound: In developing a theory of
liability for AA-caused harm, erroneous characterizations of AAs must be avoided,
such as attributions of mental states and consciousness. It is also crucial to be aware
of the legal fction that is involved in analogizing AAs to human employees. Te
ascription of agency to AAs is a legal metaphor, not a scientifc or metaphysical
description of their inner characteristics. Moreover, in selecting a liability
category for AAs, it is best to not assume any particular reasonably-contested
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philosophical view about sophisticated technologies and artifcial intelligence,
including positions in ongoing debates about whether technological artifacts can
have autonomy or moral agency. Te liability question is about legal duties that
human (or corporate) actors owe to each other when supplying or using AAs. Te
liability determination should focus solely on the salient efects of AAs on human
interaction, not on AAs’ ontological or moral status.86 Te proper role of legal
metaphor is limited: to evaluate AAs’ normative position within legal relations—
their impact on rights and duties of legal persons—not to conceptualize their
general metaphysical character. Tis theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused
harm, admittedly, adopts an intentional stance toward AAs, as legal actors,
acting on behalf of human deployers.87 However, this intentional stance is not
an afrmation of a particular philosophical view of emergent technology. It is a
legal and normative interpretation of the social relation between deployers, AAs,
and their tort victims, where AAs are deployed to advance deployers’ goals while
producing characteristic risks of harm.
Aside from the theoretical leap to view AAs as legal actors, applying vicarious
liability to AA-caused harm entails several doctrinal incongruencies. As stated
above, vicarious liability typically involves three components: (a) a tort; (b)
committed by an employee; (c) in the course of employment. Vicarious liability
for AA-caused harm should then involve three analogous components: a tort
committed by an AA, a deployee, in the course of deployment. Tere are several
complications, however: Is there a way to diferentiate between various instances
of AA-caused harm as tortious or non-tortious? Can AAs and their deployers
compose legal relations comparable to employment, thereby empowering AAs to
give efect to legal consequences for deployers? Is there a way to establish whether
AAs act within, or outside, the scope of deployment?
To impose vicarious liability in all instances of AA-caused harm would
be, in efect, to impose an absolute liability standard, foreign to tort law. It is,
therefore, necessary to discover a method to evaluate AA-caused harm as tortious
or non-tortious. Establishing and defning the scope of legal agency relations
between deployers and AAs, however, is especially problematic: If AAs are
not legal persons, they presumably lack capacity to be party to legal relations.
In this respect, the fact that human employees are legal persons has doctrinal
consequences that may not be relevant in the context of AA-caused harm. First,
under vicarious liability, employers may seek indemnity from employees. Tis is
likely impossible in the context of AA-caused harm, unless legislation requires the
86. See generally Jack B Balkin, “Te Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 Cal L Rev 45 at 47-48.
87. Te intentional stance is discussed at Part III(A), below.
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particular AA-tortfeasor to be insured. Moreover, where employees commit torts,
plaintifs are entitled to sue the employees directly. Again, this aspect of vicarious
liability cannot apply to AA-caused harm, unless legislation deems the particular
AA-tortfeasor to be a legal person and suable. Tese doctrinal divergences stem
from the fact that, in this account, AAs have an ambiguous and problematic legal
identity. On the one hand, AAs are deemed to be legal actors, as their outward
behaviours may be evaluated as tortious, grounding deployers’ vicarious liability.
Yet, without legal personhood status, it is not clear that AAs can comprise legal
agency relations and cause, by their own acts, legal efects for deployers.
It is not self-evident that there is a plausible solution to these complications.
It is not surprising that emergent technologies do not ft seamlessly within a
pre-existing framework for torts committed by human employees. In the
remainder of this article, nonetheless, I attempt a preliminary sketch of a theory
of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm. A successful theory needs to account
for divergences between the ordinary doctrinal elements of vicarious liability and
its application in the context of AA-caused harm. It should also make explicit the
legal conception of AAs that is implicit in the vicarious liability account.
Let us begin by identifying the legal conception of AAs that is, in my view,
implicit in the vicarious liability account. It involves recognizing a novel legal
category for AAs: AAs are pure legal agents—that is, legal agents without
legal personhood.88 As legal agents, AAs have legal capacity to trigger legal
consequences for deployers (who are legal persons). However, as entities without
legal personhood, AAs do not produce legal consequences on their own account.
Te classifcation of AAs as legal agents without personhood can explain a
diference between AAs and human employees in the way their respective agency
relations would arise. AAs are deemed legal agents due to their inherent social
role, as functional actors who act exclusively for deployers’ purposes and interests,
not their own. By contrast, in the employment context, since human employees
are also independent legal persons with personal purposes and interests, agency
relations arise due to particular (contractual) choices of employees to enter into
employment. Furthermore, classifying AAs as legal agents without personhood
helps to explain the various doctrinal divergences outlined above. In typical
instances of vicarious liability, the tort is committed by a legal agent who is also
88. Tis category is proposed by Samir Chopra & Laurence F White, A Legal Teory for
Autonomous Artifcial Agents (University of Michigan Press, 2011) at 25. A pure legal
agency classifcation also responds to Ryan Calo’s suggestion that the law may need to adopt
a “new category of legal subject, halfway between person and object.” “Robotics and Lessons
of Cyberlaw”, supra note 3 at 549.
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an independent legal person, grounding multiple responsibility bases; victims
may sue either employees or employers, and employers may seek indemnity from
employees. By contrast, in the context of AA-caused harm, since AAs are not
legal persons, there is only one potential responsibility base: the deployers, not
AAs themselves.
In sketching a theory of pure legal agency, the point of departure is tort law
and vicarious liability. Te legal conception of AAs that emerges in this account
relates specifcally to the role of legal agency in vicarious liability, based on an
analogy between AA deployment and human employment. My aim is to make
explicit a certain legal and normative interpretation of AA-mediated interaction
that is implicit in the application of vicarious liability to AA-caused harm. I now
turn to consider each component of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm: (a)
tortious harm; (b) committed by an AA deployee; (c) in the course of deployment.
A. AAS AS TORTFEASORS: ADOPTING AN INTENTIONAL STANCE

Te foundation of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm is a completed tort
committed by an AA. AAs are, then, viewed as potential tortfeasors, as bases of
deployers’ vicarious liability. Te rough idea is this: Te external actions of AAs
are evaluated as tortious or non-tortious based on the degree of risk they pose
to others. AAs’ external actions—not their inner-algorithmic mechanisms—are
evaluated as tortious. Tis approach resembles tort law’s ordinary evaluation of
tortious action. It considers whether particular external actions are consistent
with systematic norms of rightful interaction, and an action is tortious if it
poses a risk exceeding the level of risk typically assumed in ordinary patterns
of interaction, as per an objective standard of care.89 Tort law does not typically
judge the inner mechanisms causing actions, such as actors’ intentionality,
nor does it judge the tortfeasors’ subjective blameworthiness.90 Te same goes
for evaluating AAs’ actions under vicarious liability: AAs’ external actions are
tortious if they impose excessive levels of risk to other persons and property,
inconsistent with norms of rightful interaction, as expected of the reasonable
person. For example, if a self-driving vehicle fails to notice a stop sign and injures
a pedestrian in an intersection, the self-driving vehicle will have acted negligently
if, and only if, a reasonable person (driver) would have noticed the stop sign and
avoided collision. In this way, the liability determination side-steps problematic
and expensive inquiry into the inner defectiveness of AAs’ algorithms, focussing
89. Stephen Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk and the Law of Torts” in Gerald Postema,
eds, Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 72 at 111.
90. See Holmes, supra note 32.
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instead on their outward behaviours and efects. It also thereby recognizes that
AAs are not ordinary products; their sophisticated processes, outputs and efects
resemble action.
Some legal scholars have proposed viewing AAs as tortfeasors. Ryan Abbott,
for instance, reasons that if computers carry out activities once performed
exclusively by humans and cause similar kinds of harm, they should be viewed
as potential tortfeasors.91 Abbott contrasts three kinds of cases that illustrate the
relation between human action, technological artifacts, and applicable liability
standards. In the frst case, a human crane operator incorrectly identifes a drop
of location and drops a steel frame on a passerby.92 In this case, the operator’s
error is the cause of harm, and liability is judged under the law of negligence.93
In the second case, a human crane operator manipulates a crane properly and
under normal conditions, yet the crane is defective and tips over, landing on a
passerby.94 In this second case, the crane’s defectiveness is the cause of harm, and
liability is evaluated as a matter of products liability, not based on the operator’s
conduct.95 In the third case, an unmanned autonomous computer operates a
crane, misidentifes the drop of location and drops the steel frame on a passerby.96
Abbott states that under prevailing tort law, scenarios two and three are treated
alike; in both instances, harm is caused by defective products, and liability is
evaluated under the products liability regime.97 However, Abbott argues that
scenario three—where the autonomous computer operator misidentifes the drop
of location, dropping the frame on a passerby—is closely related to scenario one,
where a human operator misidentifes the drop of location, dropping the frame
on a passerby. Both scenarios involve the same kind of action and the same kind
of physical result.98 In Abbott’s account, in the second case, the crane is a mere
product, to be investigated for tortious defects. By contrast, in the third case,
the “computer has stepped into the shoes of the worker; it has replaced a person,
and it is performing in essentially the same manner as a person.”99 Terefore,
Abbott reasons, in the third case, the autonomous crane should be viewed as a
91. Ryan Abbott, “Te Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability” (2018)
86 Geo Wash L Rev at 23.
92. Ibid at 24.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid at 25.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
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“computer tortfeasor,” and manufacturers’ liability should depend on whether
the computer’s external actions are tortious, not its product-defectiveness.100
Notably, since Abbott grounds manufacturers’ liability in the tortious actions of
the machines they distribute, his theory is essentially a form of vicarious liability:
He efectively deems computer tortfeasors to be agents of their manufacturers,
thereby attributing computer torts to manufacturer principals.
Similarly, in the automated-vehicle context, Jefrey Gurney proposes that
the law treat manufacturers as drivers of automated vehicles they distribute, and
that liability should be determined based on the vehicles’ (un)reasonable actions,
not its product-defects.101 Gurney points out that automated vehicles provide
little opportunity for driver control, especially when they are designed without
steering wheels or breaks.102 As a result, with automated vehicles, liability shifts
from drivers to driving systems, falling mainly on manufacturers.103 However,
with respect to the theory of manufacturers’ liability, Gurney suggests that the
law treat manufacturers as the drivers of automated vehicles, turning liability into
a “simple matter under negligence,” rather than a “complicated matter under
products liability.”104 Gurney warns that applying products liability to software
and algorithmic defects is especially burdensome, not designed for everyday
accidents.105 Products liability litigation would be enormously expensive,
as it involves complex and specialized evidence about algorithms and sensor data,
requiring expert witnesses.106 Gurney maintains that a reasonable driver standard
can apply to automated vehicles.107 Like human drivers, autonomous vehicles
would be expected, for instance, to drive within proper lanes. What happens if,
in a particular instance, an autonomous vehicle crosses the centre line causing a
harmful accident? If a reasonable driver would not have crossed the center line,
the action is deemed tortious and its manufacturer is liable.108 Gurney’s theory
is vicarious liability in form: tortious acts of automated vehicles are attributed to
their manufacturers. While Gurney does not explicitly acknowledge the parallel
100. Ibid at 26.
101. Jefrey K Gurney, “Imputing Driverhood: Applying a Reasonable Driver Standard to
Accidents Caused by Autonomous Vehicles” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins,
eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University Press,
2017) 51 at 59-60.
102. Ibid at 53.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid at 59.
105. Ibid at 60.
106. Ibid at 55.
107. Ibid at 61.
108. Ibid.
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to vicarious liability, his own phrase, “imputing driverhood,” nicely captures
the idea of agency, where actions of agents are attributed to their principals (not
merely the resultant liability costs of actions, as elaborated upon above, in Part II).
In evaluating AAs’ outward actions as tortious—rather than inspecting their
inner-algorithmic-design for product defects—the law implicitly adopts a legal
intentional stance toward AAs as legal actors.109 In this respect, I allude to a
central concept in intentional systems theory, formulated by Daniel Dennett.110
In brief, Dennett sets out three basic stances used to interpret or predict the
behaviour of other objects or entities. Te frst is the physical stance, where an
object’s physical constitution and the laws of physics are used to predict what an
object will do. Te physical stance is typically used, for instance, when predicting
the outcome of releasing a stone from one’s hand.111 Te second is the design
stance, where an assumption is made that an object is designed to function in a
particular way, and its behaviour is predicted based on this assumption.112 Te
design stance is adopted with respect to objects like alarm clocks or chainsaws,
where users typically assume that if they follow design instructions, the objects
will operate as they are designed to function.113 It is greatly impractical to predict
or interpret the behaviour of these objects using a physical stance, to scrutinize
their physical properties and the laws of physics to work out how to manipulate
them efectively.114 Te third is the intentional stance, where an object is treated
as an agent, with beliefs and desires, as well as the rationality to implement these
imputed beliefs and desires.115 According to Dennett, the intentional stance is
useful where an object’s behaviour is extremely complicated and most-easily
predicted or interpreted by attributing to it a sense of rationality and goal-oriented
behaviour.116 For instance, to win a game of chess against a computer, it is best
to predict the computer’s moves as if it is a rational agent who knows the rules of
chess and wants to win the game. Tis approach is more efective than inspecting
its internal design, to calculate the many lines of computer code that determine
109. Chopra and White generally argue in favour of adopting an intentional stance towards AAs.
See Chopra & White, supra note 88 at 11-17.
110. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems Teory” in Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P McLaughlin
& Sven Walter, eds, Te Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University
Press, 2009) 339.
111. Ibid at 340.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid at 340-41.
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its next move.117 As Dennett emphasizes, in instances like chess-playing, the
intentional stance works because the computer is designed to “‘reason’ about the
best move to make in the highly rationalistic setting of chess.”118 Te intentional
stance may then be appreciated as a sub-species of the design stance: Te
intentional stance works because the object is designed to behave rationally.119
Dennett also extends this key insight to human interaction: Humans
view each other as intentional systems, using attributions of beliefs, desires,
and rationality to anticipate or interpret human action, while remaining
ignorant (for the most part) of peoples’ actual internal mental processes.120
In this view, the intentional stance is adopted with respect to a continuum of
intentional systems, including humans, animals, and sophisticated artifacts—a
range of instances where the attribution of intentional states gives meaning
to behaviour where internal states are largely unknown.121 Moreover, Dennett
rejects the notion that, for sophisticated technological artifacts, the intentional
stance is merely derived intentionality, but not original intentionality, or that it
is metaphorical, not literal.122 Te point is that the intentional stance works to
predict or interpret the object’s behaviour regardless of whether the attributed
goals are really appreciated, genuine or otherwise. Tere are still diferences
between various intentional systems; some are simple, others more complex.123
Dennett distinguishes between frst-order intentional systems—whose behaviour
is predictable by attributing beliefs or desires to it—and second-order (or third
or fourth, et cetera) systems, whose behaviour is predictable by attributing to
it beliefs about beliefs (or desires). In Dennett’s view, however, the intentional
stance exploits the “deep similarity” between the whole continuum of intentional
systems to investigate the diferences between them.124 Te intentional stance is,
then, a “theory-neutral way of capturing the cognitive competences of diferent
organisms (or other agents) without committing the investigator to overspecifc
hypotheses about the internal structures that underlie the competences.”125
Returning to tort law, to view AAs as tortfeasors is to assume an intentional
stance toward AAs, conceived of as legal actors. Te liability determination turns
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Ibid at 341.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 341-42.
Ibid at 342-43.
Ibid at 343.
Ibid at 344.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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on whether their actions are consistent with the norms of rightful interaction.
It does not turn on whether they are defective products due to tortious actions
by other legal persons (i.e., manufacturers or designers). To legally regard AAs’
outward efects as actions—and subject to norms of rightful interaction—
represents a legal move toward an intentional stance, away from a design stance.
Typically, with respect to products, the law assumes a design stance: Te product is
expected to function according to its marketed design and operating instructions.
If it does not, the law investigates whether it was designed, manufactured, or used
tortiously by a responsible legal subject. Under a design stance, the law does not
consider whether the product acted wrongfully, as the product does not act in
the requisite legal sense. Rather, product defectiveness triggers an investigation
of its legally responsible cause by an action of its manufacturer, designer, or user.
By contrast, in applying vicarious liability to AA-caused harm, the law adopts
an intentional stance: Tort analysis revolves around the reasonableness of AAs’
external actions. Te law elevates AAs’ outward efects to the realm of legal action,
with legal capacity to commit torts.
To be clear, in this context, to adopt an intentional stance is to assume
AAs’ outward efects are actions for the purposes of tort law, circumventing the
need to further investigate the actions of manufacturers, designers, or users.
Crucially, however, the legal intentional stance should not implicate any further
philosophical positions, such as the general appropriateness of attributing mental
states to sophisticated technologies, as under intentional systems theory. It would
be a mistake for the law to take a position on any particular philosophy of mind.
Accordingly, this vicarious liability account does not take a position on whether
intentional systems theory is a suitable way to make sense of commonly used
mentalistic terms such as beliefs, desires, or intentions. It also does not take a
position on whether humans, animals, and technological artifacts represent a
genuine continuum of related intentional systems. I emphasize, in this respect,
that under standard accounts of agency, AAs are not truly agents, as originators
of something that counts as action.126 According to standard accounts, to count
as actions, one’s doings must be causally related to particular intentional mental

126. Kenneth Einar Himma, “Artifcial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral
Agency: What Properties Must an Artifcial Agent Have To Be a Moral Agent?” (2009) 11
Ethics Info Tech 19 at 20-29.
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states, such as a belief and desire pair or volition.127 Crucially, if agency implicates
intentional mental states, it also presupposes consciousness, as mental states are
privately observable by introspection.128 Pursuant to standard accounts of agency,
therefore, absent mental states and consciousness, AAs cannot be agents at all.129
Nevertheless, intentional systems theory helps to illuminate the legal move
to vicarious liability for AA-caused harm. It involves an altered stance: (1) to
view AAs as rational actors that carry out goal-oriented tasks for human or
corporate deployers; and (2) to evaluate AAs’ actions according to an objective
standard of rightful interaction. It is still crucial to acknowledge, however, that
adopting an intentional stance is a legal fction. If the outward efects of AAs
are deemed to be actions for liability purposes, it is necessary to confront and
reject the implicit supposition that AAs have (something comparable to) mental
states causing their outward efects. After all, in ordinary instances, tort actions
are necessarily expressions of volition, implicating a cluster of intentional states,
such as intentions to act, beliefs, and desires (including second-order beliefs and
desires).130 To treat AAs as legal agents—elevating their outward efects to the
realm of tortious action—problematically ensnares the possibility of artifcial
agency. I therefore emphasize that adopting an intentional stance toward AAs is
a liability maneuver: AAs’ agency is a legal fction, not the legal recognition of a
pre-existing metaphysical truth.131
127. Ibid at 20. Moreover, under standard accounts, moral agency—that is, to be subject to moral
obligations and to be held accountable for one’s actions—necessarily involves two further
capacities. First, the capacity to freely act, which necessarily entails—under both libertarian
and compatibilist conceptions—that actors (directly) cause their own behaviour and are not
directly compelled by something external. Second, the capacity to engage in moral reasoning,
which includes the ability to identify moral concepts and principles—to diferentiate wrong
from right—and apply them to specifc contexts. Ibid at 21-24.
128. Ibid at 24-27.
129. Ibid at 28-29.
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 2 (1965).
131. I do not mean to use the term legal fction in a pejorative sense. AAs’ legal agency is a fction
in the sense that it does not necessarily correspond to some real metaphysical truth about
artifcial agency. However, as a legal fction, it is a conceptual and normative interpretation
of the relational structure of AA-mediated human interaction, which is, in my view, coherent
and justifed as a matter of tort law, as argued below in the text. As a general matter, since
AA-caused harm demands reconstruction of tort doctrine, involving new forms of analogical
reasoning, it is not surprising if it also involves making use of a legal fction. On this point,
see LL Fuller, “Legal Fictions” (1931) 25 Ill L Rev 513 at 527-28. Fuller observes that
“[d]eveloping felds of law, felds where new social and business practices are necessitating a
reconstruction of legal doctrine, nearly always present ‘artifcial construction,’ and, in many
cases, outright fctions.”
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However, this gives rise to the following questions: Is this legal fction
coherent and justifed as a matter of tort law? Is it feasible to adopt an intentional
stance toward AAs’ outward efects, deemed to be tortious actions, without
taking a position on the possibility of artifcial agency? In my view, adopting
this legal fction is both intelligible and sensible, as a matter of tort law. First,
under intentional systems theory, the move to an intentional stance is justifed
if the intentional stance enables better prediction or interpretation of an entity’s
behaviour than under the alternative physical or design stances. Te liability
maneuver to adopt an intentional stance follows similar reasoning, though with
a legal spin: Liability for AAs’ harmful efects is more easily addressed under
an intentional stance—by evaluating their external behaviours—than under a
design stance, entailing onerous scrutiny of AAs’ defective algorithms. To insist
on products liability for AA-caused harm is the legal equivalent of attempting to
beat a chess-playing-computer by inspecting its internal design and calculating
its many lines of code. Jefrey Gurney emphasizes this point: “Treating the
manufacturer as the driver makes what would have been a complicated matter
under products liability a simple matter under negligence.”132 Accordingly,
adopting an intentional stance toward AAs—as a legal fction—serves a worthy
and pragmatic legal purpose: to streamline the liability evaluation.
Second, tort law involves judgement about external actions, not actors’ inner
mental states or subjective blameworthiness. It may be conceded that since tort
involves judgment of actions, the object of judgment is typically an expression of
volition, implicating a mental state. Nevertheless, while the existence of a mental
state is typically a pre-condition of tortious action, it is not the mental state itself
that is judged as tortious. Tort liability does not respond to defendants’ moral
blameworthiness; it responds to external actions that are inconsistent with norms
of rightful interaction, defned by an objective standard of care. Tort liability
typically obligates defendants to repair losses caused by acts that are inconsistent
with these norms, regardless of whether the actor could have acted diferently in
the particular circumstances. Tis approach can be coherently extended to the
outward efects of AAs that are action-like, such as where a self-driving car fails
to stop at a stop-sign and causes a harmful accident. Tort liability may assess
whether their behaviours are consistent with objective standards of interaction
expected of reasonable persons without declaring that AAs have, or do not have,
intentional states.
Tird, adopting an intentional stance toward AAs is arguably justifed in the
context of vicarious liability, which plainly attributes AAs’ actions to deployers.
132. Gurney, supra note 101 at 59.
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Since AAs are pure legal agents, the implicit ascription of intentionality to AAs
actually belongs to their human or corporate deployers. If AAs are viewed as
goal-oriented actors, it is really the deployers’ goals that are referenced. AAs’ legal
agency, in this sense, encompasses a larger system: AAs as extensions of deployers.
As pure legal agents, AAs’ actions express deployers’ intentional states, goals, and
rationality—not their own. AAs’ pure legal agency status is then a conceptual and
normative interpretation of their deployers’ extended actions: deployers-actingthrough-their-deployees. In this respect, I retrieve the interpretation of vicarious
liability where employer and employee are construed as a composite doer.
In the context of AAs, this construction is particularly illuminating. Since AAs
do not have independent legal standing, their intentional actions belong solely
to their principals. AAs’ outward efects are deemed to be intentional actions
because AAs are designed and deployed to rationally achieve assigned tasks.
AAs’ actions should thus be viewed as extensions of deployers’ intentionality.
Te evaluations of AAs’ actions could then serve as surrogates for evaluating the
responsibility of deployers.
In sum, viewing AAs as tortfeasors entails adopting an intentional stance in
which AAs have legal capacity to commit tortious acts. Tis is a pragmatic liability
maneuver with plausible theoretical foundations. Tort law can coherently evaluate
AAs’ outward efects as tortious actions without taking a position on whether
they (can) have actual intentional states. After all, tort evaluations are judgments
about external actions, not the intentional states that motivate them. Moreover,
in the context of AAs, adopting an intentional stance is best understood as a legal
interpretation of a larger system, consisting of both deployers and AAs: AAs’
actions are extensions of deployers’ intentionality. Treating AAs as tortfeasors
is, then, intrinsically tied to their position within agency relations, as deployees,
to which I turn next.
B. AAS’ DEPLOYMENT AS AN AGENCY RELATION

Vicarious liability applies to torts committed by employees in the course of
employment. In the context of AA-caused harm, pursuant to an intentional
stance, AAs may be deemed to be tortfeasors. However, to complete vicarious
liability, AAs need to be part of legally recognized deployment relations, permitting
attribution of AAs’ tortious actions to deployers, analogous to employees’ tortious
acts committed in the course of employment. For obvious reasons, as mentioned
above, AAs cannot enter legal agency relations by choice (in contrast to typical
employment scenarios). Instead, in this vicarious liability account, the law would
treat deployed AAs as inherent legal agents. Since AAs are deployed to achieve
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their deployers’ purposes, not their own, they inherently function in a way that
is characteristic of legal agents. AAs occupy a unique middle-ground, as legal
agents without personhood: Tey are instrumentally rational actors, but without
their own purposes. Tis conception provides a theoretical foundation for the
argument that AAs’ tortious actions are extensions of deployers’ intentionality,
and therefore, a surrogate for evaluating the responsibility of deployers as a
matter of vicarious liability.
To illustrate this legal conception, I turn to philosophy of technology
literature dealing with the moral signifcance of technological artifacts. Broadly
speaking, there are two important debates about the ascription of moral agency
to sophisticated technological artifacts.133 Te frst is the autonomy debate:
whether artifacts are “mere instruments,” their efects “fully explicable in terms
of designer and user intentions,” or whether artifacts may have a “degree of
autonomy,” actively causing efects in the world as goal-driven agents.134 Te
second is the moral relevance debate: whether artifacts are necessarily “morally
neutral means” to various human ends, or whether artifacts can be, in their own
respect, “morally responsible agents.”135 As Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers
argue, the moral-relevance debate is largely dependent on the autonomy debate.
Proponents of the moral neutrality position place “all moral weight on the
intentionality of the users and designers,” viewing artifacts as mere instruments
of these human intentions.136 Correspondingly, proponents of the position
ascribing moral responsibility to artifacts also ascribe a degree of autonomy and
agency to these artifacts, as active causes of morally signifcant efects.137
Tis framing admittedly oversimplifes the diversity of opinion about
artifcial moral agency; it is meant to capture the two poles—the most extreme
positions—of the debate. My aim is to highlight specifc formulations of
technological artifacts’ moral status, falling in between these two extremes, that
illuminate the theoretical foundation of AAs’ pure legal agency category. Deborah
Johnson, for instance, argues that computer systems can be moral entities, but
not independent, autonomous moral agents.138 To begin, Johnson distinguishes
between artifacts—as physical objects—and technology, which is a “combination
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of artifacts, social practices, social relationships, and systems of knowledge.”139
Johnson maintains that “artifacts are abstractions from reality:” To identify an
artifact—as an independent object or entity—is to mentally separate it from
the social context that gives it meaning and function.140 Technological artifacts,
such as computers and computer systems, exist due to, and as part of, complex
systems of (human) social practices.141 Johnson argues that the moral signifcance
of computers cannot be conceived at “levels of abstraction that separate machine
behaviour from the social practices of which it is a part and the humans who design
and use it.”142 As Johnson forcefully reasons: “No matter how independently,
automatically, and interactively computer systems of the future behave, they will
be products (direct or indirect) of human behaviour, human social institutions,
and human decision.”143
Johnson also suggests that computer systems cannot be moral agents because
they lack the capacity for voluntary behaviour that is essential to moral agency.144
According to the standard formulation, voluntary intentional action entails
an internal mental state causing an outward embodied event with an outward
efect—harm or beneft—on a recipient of the action (a patient).145 Accordingly,
voluntary intentional behaviour involves a reason explanation, not only a causal
explanation: Voluntary actions can be explained by mental states, such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions to act.146 Johnson emphasizes that computer system
behaviour can occur where computers’ internal states cause outward embodied
events, with outward efects on patients.147 Crucially, however, for computers,
the inner state (causing outward efects) is not a mental state (i.e., an intention to
act), but some other mechanistic necessity.148 Computer behaviour is amenable
only to causal explanation, not reason explanation. Computer behaviour, then,
does not entail free voluntary action and cannot ground moral agency.149 Johnson
acknowledges that machine learning techniques can enable computer behaviour
that is, in her words, non-deterministic—i.e., not directly linked to programmers’
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input—as in the case of neural networks.150 However, she maintains that, “we
have no way of knowing whether the non-deterministic character of human
behaviour and non-deterministic behaviour of computer systems are or will be
alike in the morally relevant (and admittedly mysterious) way.”151
Johnson still maintains, however, that embodied computer systems are not
morally neutral symbolic systems. Since they behave in the world—potentially
producing efects on moral patients—mechanistic computer systems can
have moral character, including intentionality (though without intentions
to act).152 According to Johnson, computer systems’ intentionality relates to its
programmed functions, “to behave in certain ways, given certain input,” that is,
to transform certain inputs into particular kinds of outputs.153 Johnson argues
that the intentionality of computer systems is connected to the intentionality
of its designers and users.154 When designing computer systems, designers
“poise them to behave in certain ways;” the computer systems then “remain
poised to behave in those ways.”155 Likewise, the intentionality of computer
systems remains latent without user activation.156 In this way, computer system
intentionality is twofold: While dependent on initial human intentionality of
designers and users, once initiated, computer systems independently produce
certain intended states of afairs without further human intervention.157 Johnson
reasons that while computer systems—taken independently—are not moral
agents, they are components of a broader moral analysis involving a triad of
intentionality: that of users, designers, and computer systems.158 Where humans
use computer systems to achieve particular tasks, the computer systems do not
act alone. Te computer system is “part of an action but it is not alone an actor;”
rather, the “triad of designer, artifact and user act(ed) as one.”159 Accordingly,
while machines cannot be moral agents, they are moral entities. As components
of human moral agency, they aid particular kinds of human action, and enable
extended human intentionality and efcacy—that is, actions that are otherwise
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more difcult or impossible.160 Johnson also argues that computer behaviour
expresses designers’ and users’ intentionality even where designers and users
are unable to predict precisely what the computer system will do.161 In these
instances, designers and users are simply engaging in risky behaviour, initiating
actions with consequences that they cannot foresee. However, the computer
behaviour still expresses intentionality and efcacy that its designers and users
“put into the world.”162
In a similar vein, Johnson and Tomas Powers recommend thinking about
computers’ moral agency as a kind of surrogate agency.163 In standard accounts
of agency, moral agents act from a frst-person perspective, pursuing their own
interests based on their own beliefs about the world.164 By contrast, surrogate
agents act (primarily) from a third-person perspective, pursuing the interests of
their clients, not their own.165 Johnson and Powers reason that computer systems’
agency is akin to that of surrogate agents: “[Tey] are designed and deployed
to do tasks assigned to them by humans.”166 Importantly, this argument does
not depend on whether computer systems have actual autonomy, and largely
bypasses the artifcial intelligence debate. Rather, it is the link between computer
systems and human interests that makes computer systems objects of moral
evaluation.167 Johnson and Powers reject the impulse to speak about computers’
actions in psychological terms, as computer systems do not have their own
frst-person interests, nor a moral psychology.168 Computer systems (exclusively)
advance second-order interests: Tey represent users’ interests and functionally
perform tasks on their behalf.169 Computer systems’ second-order interests are
not really their own; the second-order interest is simply a combination of the
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computer program and user input.170 Tis marks a signifcant contrast with
human surrogate agents, who need to psychologically align their personal
frst-order interests with their second-order interests pursuant to the third-person
perspective required for the job.171
Johnson and Powers emphasize that in evaluating moral responsibility for
computer behaviour, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on human designers and
users, ignoring the special role of computer systems which “constrain, facilitate
and…shape what humans do.”172 At the same time, they deny that computer
systems can be morally responsible since they do not have their own frst-order
interests, nor the moral psychology or freedom required under standard accounts
of moral agency.173 Johnson and Powers acknowledge that they have not precisely
defned the instances where designers or users may—or may not—be responsible,
liable, or rightly-blamed for behaviour of computer systems.174 Nevertheless,
their framing of computer systems—as surrogate agents and extensions of human
intentionality—is valuable. It highlights a distinctive kind of normative relation
between human deployers and sophisticated technologies they deploy—the kind
of relation that the law could capture with a pure legal agency category.
Another notable view is the composite agency theory, also known as extended
agency theory, formulated by F. Allan Hanson.175 Hanson’s theory begins with
the uncontroversial idea that responsibility for a deed typically falls upon its
doer.176 However, where both human and nonhuman entities are necessary to
accomplish a certain deed, Hanson argues that both human and non-human
components comprise the relevant agency, “the doer of the deed.”177 At the core
of composite agency theory is the contention that “humans do not and cannot
act alone in order to accomplish what they do.”178 Rather, action is undertaken by
“inter-related combinations of human and nonhuman elements.”179 Te causal
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responsibility for an action’s consequences, then, lies with the extended agency
as a whole, which includes all necessary components of the action, both human
and nonhuman.180 In this view, the notion of agency is fuid, defned to include
“the lines of communication essential to [the] activity,” its components varying
with the nature of the activity.181 In composite agency theory, the doer is more
precisely identifed as a verb—“an embodied activity”—rather than a noun, as “a
collection of objects”.182
Hanson argues further: If action is explained in terms of composite agencies,
the reduction of moral agency to human individuals is unwarranted.183 Since
moral responsibility lies with doers of deeds that have moral pertinence, the
moral responsibility inquiry needs to isolate the relevant doer in any given
situation. If the action is comprised of both human and nonhuman elements,
the particular composite agency is the doer, the morally responsible agency.184
According to Hanson, moral responsibility is not fundamentally distinct from
causal responsibility: “It is a quality of causal responsibility that applies when the
act has benefcial or detrimental consequences.”185 Where a composite agency
acts with moral import—for example, causing harmful accident—the composite
agency is morally responsible.186
Hanson’s composite agency theory rejects the standard assumptions of
methodological individualism, which reduces social behaviour to the actions of
human individuals.187 According to standard individualist accounts, machines,
computers, and animals are mere objects that human agents manipulate in the
course of their actions; they are not components of agency.188 Methodological
individualism predominantly rests on a modernist social frame: It conceives of
the autonomous human individual as the most basic social unit, as an agent
retaining a fxed identity while carrying out a variety of deeds over extended
periods of time.189 In this view, the human doer precedes the deed, and “remains
stable as it moves from one deed to another.”190 By contrast, composite agency
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theory adopts a radically diferent account of agency, where “[t]he doer is defned
by the deed.”191 In this view, there are no stable agents, only indefnite varieties of
doers—that is, composite agencies—as defned by indefnite varieties of possible
deeds.192 Composite agency theory refects a postmodern social frame, rejecting
humanistic assumptions about the stable and centred autonomous nature of
human agents.193 It emphasizes the fuidity and indeterminacy of human agency,
insisting that humans only exist in relation to the nonhuman, which underlies its
embrace of an expanded ethical realm to include machine ethics.194
Hanson acknowledges that attributing moral responsibility to a composite
agency as a whole is unconventional because nonhuman artifacts lack mental
qualities such as awareness, intention, and foresight, which are indispensable
to moral agency.195 Nevertheless, Hanson argues that intentional acts are more
precisely undertaken by, and attributable to, composite agencies consisting of
both human and nonhuman components.196 Hanson concedes that moral
agency necessarily includes a human component with mental qualities, entailing
the capacity for intelligent performance. Yet, he insists that an intelligent
performance is still attributable to the composite agency as a whole, for it could not
occur—nor could it even be intended—without contribution from nonhuman
components as well.197 After all, the possibility of particular actions is informed
by particular means that are, or are not, available. In this sense, Hanson reasons
that humans are changed by the technologies they use. For instance, he argues
that “a-man-with-a-gun is a diferent being than the same man without a gun”;
they are diferent moral subjects with distinct capabilities.198 To be clear, Hanson
does not claim that technological artifacts themselves can be morally responsible.
He attributes moral responsibility to a composite agency as a whole; as the
precise cause of actions and efects, the composite agency is the relevant moral
subject.199 Te attribution of moral responsibility then extends to all components
of a composite agency as joint responsibility. Moral responsibility necessarily
extends to the human component, the locus of intentionality; however, the moral
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evaluation also encompasses nonhuman components that enable the particular
intentional act (that is, as an act that could actually be intended).200
To return to tort law, these philosophical conceptions of technological
artifacts as extending human agency can help construe the kind of normative
relation between human deployers and AAs that is implicit in vicarious liability.
As elaborated upon above in Part II, the kind of agent-specifc responsibility that
is captured by vicarious liability is explainable in two ways. First, it may refect
a conception of employer and employee as a composite doer: employer-actingthrough-employee. Alternatively, it may involve the legal attribution of the
employee’s tortious act to the employer, refecting the employer’s associational
responsibility for the act due to the employer’s identifcation with the employee’s
acts committed in the course of employment, i.e., in collective pursuit of
enterprise. In the context of AA deployment, the composite doer conception
is especially apt: Since AAs act solely for their deployers’ interests—they do not
have interests of their own—their actions may be viewed as legal extensions
of their deployers’ intentionality. Johnson makes this point by highlighting
the “triad of intentionality”—of designers, users, and computer systems—as
essentially intertwined components of a single moral analysis. Likewise, Hanson’s
conception of composite agency points to a robust conception of joint action
and joint responsibility, where both human intentionality and AAs’ functionality
combine to cause morally signifcant efects such as accidental harm. Te legal
upshot is that judging AAs’ actions as tortious must be part of a broader legal
analysis linked to the deployment relation as a whole. Te critical argument is
this: Te evaluation of AAs’ actions as tortious—pursuant to a legal intentional
stance—acquires its normative meaning from the deployer-AA relation.
It is problematic to assess AAs’ tortious actions independently—abstracted from
the deployment relation—as this severs AAs’ (tortious) actions from their source
of intentionality. Accordingly, vicarious liability for AA-caused harm refects a
composite doer or associational conception of the deployment relation, where
both human and AA components jointly produce tortious harm. Te evaluation
of AAs’ actions as tortious can then serve as a surrogate for evaluating tortious
responsibility of deployers.201
200. Ibid at 96-97.
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Tis is certainly not a wholesale legal endorsement of Hanson’s composite
agency theory or Johnson’s surrogate agency theory. Tese theories contain
several features that should be distinguished from the issue of tort liability for
AA-caused harm. First, they are about moral agency and moral responsibility,
not legal agency and legal responsibility. Second, they apply to a broader class of
technological artifacts, not only emergent AAs with functional autonomy. Tird,
Hanson’s rejection of methodological individualism is probably inconsistent
with the corrective justice account of tort, which rests on the possibility that
responsibility for wrongful interaction is typically reducible to individual human
agents. Finally, Hanson’s conception of moral responsibility—which extends
to all composite agencies—is a special kind of causal responsibility where acts
have morally signifcant consequences, causing beneft or harm. In the corrective
justice account, by contrast, tort liability involves wrongful causation of harm.
Absent breach of duty, causation of loss is insufcient to ground liability, despite
the moral signifcance of harm caused. Tort liability is not a practice of pure
causal responsibility.
Nevertheless, these theories contain a key insight that is instructive in cases
of AA-caused harm: Te legal evaluation of AAs’ actions must relate to the
deployment relation as a whole, where AAs’ tortious actions stand in as surrogates
for deployers’ actions. I stress that this is a legal conception, native to vicarious
liability, a tort doctrine that captures a form of social interaction whereby a social
actor is bound by the acts of an associated actor. In the context of AAs, vicarious
liability refects special responsibility for deploying AAs to perform particular
tasks of deployment, producing the characteristic risk of misalignment and
(tortious) AA-caused harm. I concede that adopting an intentional stance toward
AAs is controversial. But it is justifed in the context of pure legal agency, where
the legal analysis maintains the form of vicarious liability, implicating a broader
deployment relation (that includes human intentionality), not AAs’ independent
moral character.
C. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DEPLOYMENT

I have so far suggested that the deployment of AAs may be viewed as a legal agency
relation between deployers and AAs, akin to an employment relation. Te tortious
acts of AAs committed in the course of deployment could then be attributed to
deployers. However, this leads to a further question: How does one assess whether
tortious actions of AAs fall within the scope of the deployment (agency) relation?
If AAs’ outward actions could fall outside scope of deployment, deployers would
be able to disclaim the tortious acts of their AAs as unauthorized and frolic-like.
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Tis potentially undermines the application of vicarious liability for AA-caused
harm. David Vladeck cautions, in this respect, that if an autonomous machine
acts in ways not pre-ordained by their initial programming—deciding for itself
what course of action to take—the agency relation may breakdown.202
I aim to push back against Vladeck’s view: Under vicarious liability,
employers can be liable for unauthorized tortious acts of employees, provided
such acts are sufciently related to their assigned tasks of employment. Even
prohibited conduct still falls within the course of employment where it can be
regarded as a mode—albeit an improper one—of carrying out authorized acts of
business.203 Recall the infuential case, Ira S Bushey, where an employee tortiously
turned wheels on a drydock wall causing the ship to fall against the drydock,
which had no legitimate business rationale.204 Nevertheless, the Court found it
to be part of the seafaring activity, as it took place on the ship while attending to
seafaring matters.205 In that case, the crucial factor grounding vicarious liability
was that the risk of that kind of tortious damage to the drydock was characteristic
of the seafaring enterprise, which employed seamen who recurrently crossed the
drydock while drunk.206 While the particular actions of the employee were not
authorized business activities, they were sufciently linked to the enterprise and
the employment relation as a whole. Likewise, recall Bazley v. Curry, where the
Supreme Court held the defendant care facility vicariously liable for its employee’s
sexual assault of children in its care.207 Te employee was certainly not authorized
to commit intentional torts such as sexual assault. Moreover, the employee’s
sexual assault impeded, rather than advanced, the actual purposes of enterprise.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of vicarious liability, the scope of employment is
construed more broadly: If the particular assigned tasks of employment provide
special opportunity for the particular kind of ensuing tortious harm, the tortious
act falls within the course of employment so is attributable to the employer.208
Accordingly, deployers can be vicariously liable for tortious harm caused by
AAs, even if AAs’ actions are unauthorized and unwanted. At this early point,
lacking experience with AA deployment, it is difcult to precisely defne the scope
of deployment. However, I will ofer an initial way to think about this issue. Te
scope of an AA deployment relation should be defned by an AA’s task: Deployers
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are vicariously liable where tortious harm caused by an AA falls within the scope
of the characteristic risk of its deployment. Te scope of AA deployment, then,
is defned by the deployment risk, analogous to the doctrinal requirement of
enterprise risk. As discussed, the notion of enterprise risk draws a link between
an employee’s tortious act and the risk in employing the tortious actor to perform
an assigned task. Likewise, to ground vicarious liability, an AA’s tortious act
needs to be sufciently linked to distinct risk in deploying the AA to perform
its assigned task. Where there is a sufcient nexus between the resulting tortious
harm and the deployment’s characteristic risk—i.e., the deployment risk—the
deployment is properly implicated as jointly producing the tortious AA-caused
harm. For example, in the context of automated vehicles, deployers may be
vicariously liable for harm caused by AAs’ driving-related errors. Deployers may
not be vicariously liable, however, for accidents that fall outside the usual scope of
driving. For instance, if a car is programmed to experiment with energy efciency
and starts its engine in a garage to recharge its battery causing a passenger’s
death by carbon monoxide, the resulting harm may fall outside the scope of
driving-related harms.209 Te point is that vicarious liability for AA-caused harm
takes this form: Deployers are liable where AAs cause tortious harm falling within
the scope of risk associated with their ordinary tasks. Te resulting AA-caused
harm must correspond to a characteristic risk in deploying the particular AA,
thereby conforming to the doctrinal structure of deployment risk (analogous to
enterprise risk).
D. WHO ARE THE DEPLOYERS?

Te account sketched thus far has not addressed who the deployers are for the
purposes of vicarious liability. Are they the users (or owners) of AAs or the
distributors (e.g., manufacturers, designers, retailers) of AAs?
One argument is that users should be vicariously liable, not distributors.
Since AAs perform tasks for, and pursue the goals of, their users, they may be
conceived of as users’ legal agents. By contrast, AAs do not perform specifc tasks
for manufactures, designers, or retailers. Te employment analogy, then, pertains
more straightforwardly to AAs’ users than to their distributors. Te connection
between AAs and their distributors, moreover, refects a design stance. AAs are
designed, manufactured, and distributed as products. It is only once users deploy
AAs to perform tasks in social environments that AAs resemble social actors.
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Terefore, the argument concludes, AAs’ tortious actions should belong to their
users, not their distributors.
But there is also an argument to support imposing vicarious liability on
AAs’ distributors. AAs may be conceived of as agents of distributors since they
refect the intentionality that their designers and manufacturers build into
them. As Deborah Johnson puts it, designers “poise them to behave in certain
ways,” and they “remain poised to behave in those ways.”210 Conceiving of
AAs as legal agents of distributors also refects their distinctive middle-ground
character, falling somewhere between full-fedged persons and mere things.211
AAs are artifacts; they are designed, produced and distributed as products.
Products liability is, therefore, a conventional liability category for AA-caused
harm, implicating distributors, not users. At the same time, AAs’ emergent
capabilities resist application of conventional products liability, which entails
burdensome inspection of algorithms for defects, and misapprehends AAs’ social
and normative position as functionally independent instrumentalities. For these
reasons, vicarious liability is an attractive solution. Tis framing points to a
conception of AAs as sophisticated products with intentionality linked to their
designers and manufacturers. Distributors should then be vicariously liable for
AAs’ tortious harm, as a sub-species of products liability: Te vicarious liability
standard refects the fact that these products are emergent and act with functional
independence. Moreover, regarding AAs as agents of manufacturers, rather than
users, represents a more incremental development of tort law. As a sub-species of
products liability, manufacturers’ vicarious liability can be framed as a revamped
consumer-expectations test: Consumers expect AAs to operate as reasonable
persons would.212 AAs’ product defectiveness would then be determined with
respect to their outward behaviour, not their internal design, as per the legal
intentional stance.
I conclude this discussion without taking a position on this issue; it sufces
to fag both approaches as possible tort doctrines. My reluctance to determine
the identity of the deployer does not undermine this article’s vicarious liability
210. Johnson, supra note 138 at 201.
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analysis. My intent is to present vicarious liability as a suitable form of tort
liability for AA-caused harm. Te issue of which entities should be deployers for
the purposes of vicarious liability—whether users or distributors—is a separate
inquiry. It presupposes, however, an initial foundation that vicarious liability is a
suitable form of liability for AA-caused harm. Te aim of this article is to explore
this foundation: Vicarious liability for AA-caused harm involves conceiving
of AAs as pure legal agents with capacity to efect liability consequences for
deployers. Within this account, however, either users or distributors could
be deemed, in law, to be deployers for the purposes of vicarious liability. Te
choice between users and distributors, crucially, should be informed by more
robust considerations of policy, a line of inquiry falling outside the scope of
this article. Te pure legal agency or vicarious liability account, in this sense,
is underdetermined, so it can and should be supplemented with more concrete
reasons relating to efcient accident-cost allocation, incentivizing technological
innovation, securing compensatory access for faultless victims, and interpersonal
accountability—on economic and ethical grounds.

IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF AAS’ PURE LEGAL AGENCY
In this study, the point of departure was tort law. Te pure legal agency conception
of AAs relates specifcally to a theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused harm,
based on an analogy between AA deployment and human employment. AAs are
conceived of as pure legal agents, empowered to trigger their deployers’ vicarious
liability. Since this classifcation views AAs as legal agents, it also implicates the
laws of agency more generally. AAs’ pure legal agency category, then, needs to
be situated within a broader agency framework, compared and contrasted with
ordinary instances of legal agency constituted by two legal persons. In particular,
I note two essential features that typically constitute legal agency relations: the
frst is a mutually manifested assent by principal and agent; the second is a set of
fduciary duties owed by agents to principals. A theory of AAs’ pure legal agency
must account for the apparent absence of these features. Tis section sketches
the relation between pure legal agency and ordinary legal agency constituted by
two legal persons. Tis account is admittedly partial and incomplete, however;
it is only a preliminary point of entry toward a theory of pure legal agency.
Legal agency relations ordinarily arise upon mutually manifested assent by
a principal and agent; that the agent acts for, and subject to the control of, the
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principal.213 Te requisite manifestations of assent can occur in several ways:
by contract, whether express or implied, oral or written; ratifcation, where
the principal assents to an act after-the-fact; estoppel, where a person acts for
another to an extent that causes others to reasonably believe an agency relation
exists; or necessity, where a person acts for another in an emergency.214 Samir
Chopra and Laurence White note that legal agency relations may arise due to
observable actions of principal and agent, without express agreement of agency.215
Tis occurs, for instance, in situations of estoppel. AAs’ pure legal agency would
fall under this rubric; their legal agency status is inferred from their roles and
behaviours. Te initiation of an AA agency relation certainly diverges from typical
instances of legal agency wherein legal agents are also legal persons who manifest
assent in more obvious ways. Nevertheless, as Chopra and White maintain, there
is a doctrinal basis for inferring AAs’ legal agency from their deployment itself.216
A second fundamental feature of legal agency is the set of duties that
agents owe to their principals. Tese include, among others, duties to obey
principals’ instructions, to act with skill and loyalty, and to protect confdential
information.217 We must ask: Can AAs have, and fulfl, duties to their deployers?
Chopra and White argue that “artifcial agents can be coherently understood
as having duties to their principals if we can understand them as acting in
conformity with statements that are best understood as their obligations to their
principals.”218 Tis position refects an intentional stance; AAs’ performances of
required tasks—for instance, submitting daily reports of earnings to principals—
is interpreted as compliance with duties.219
My contention, however, is that the terminology of rights and duties—
that AAs owe duties to deployers who hold correlative rights—is unftting in
the context of AAs’ pure legal agency. Since AAs lack legal personhood, they
probably cannot participate in juridical relations constituted by correlative rights
and duties. If this is true, one may object to AAs’ classifcation as legal agents;
after all, fduciary duties are central to legal agency. Nevertheless, my thought is
that AAs’ legal agency status—that is, their powers to efect legal consequences
for deployers—is coherent even without owing fduciary duties to deployers.
213. Restatement (Tird) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).
214. Chopra & White, supra note 88 at 19, citing Robert W Emerson & John W Hardwicke,
Business Law, 3rd ed (Barron’s Educational Series, 1997) at 251.
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Te rough argument is this: Fiduciary duties are required to constitute legal
agency relations specifcally where legal agents are independent legal persons
with their own interests. In such cases, agents’ conficts of interest are a real
concern, so fduciary duties serve to ensure agents act only for the interests of
their principals. By contrast, since AAs are pure legal agents, without interests of
their own, fduciary duties are largely redundant. AAs inherently and exclusively
pursue their deployers’ purposes.220
As a general matter, fduciary obligations lie at the core of legal agency,
integral to the exercise of fduciary power. Fiduciary obligations are about
ensuring the agent’s loyalty: allegiance or dedication to the principal’s cause rather
than to self-interest.221 Fiduciary relationships arise where a legal actor holds
discretionary power: the capacity to exercise judgment for a benefciary.222 Lionel
Smith understands the requirement of loyalty as a required manner of exercising
judgment, where fduciaries need to subjectively believe that their choices are
in the best interests of benefciaries.223 While there are several constraints on
fduciaries’ powers that are assessed objectively—such as duties of care, skill, and
diligence—the requirement of loyalty has a subjective character.224
Te fduciary power and its requirement of loyalty are not simply
contractual.225 Te grant of fduciary power can be voluntary, as in typical
principal-agent relationships; however, fduciary powers may also exist as a
matter of law, as in cases of company directors and executors who hold powers in
managerial capacities.226 Te fduciary requirement of loyalty is imposed by law
if, and only if, a certain kind of role is assumed: “When one person acquires the
authority to make decisions on behalf of another person, there is a partial transfer
of autonomy.”227 In this situation, the fduciary is authorized to act for the other,
not just in a way that afects the other.228 Smith argues that the requirement
of loyalty is an inherent feature of the fduciary relation: It is built into the
power itself.229 In fduciary relations, he reasons, fduciaries are empowered to
220. See Johnson & Powers, supra note 163 at 255-59; Johnson, supra note 138 at 201-203.
221. Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf
of Another” (2014) 130 Law Q Rev 608 at 608-609.
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exercise a part of the benefciaries’ autonomy by making decisions that belong
to benefciaries.230 Te fduciary makes decisions for the benefciary; that is, the
fduciary exercises the benefciary’s decision-making power.231 Since the fduciary
power is about exercising the autonomy of another, the requirement of loyalty
is not an external duty but an aspect of the power itself, the very meaning of
acting for the benefciary. Te requirement of loyalty, then, is not a duty in the
strict sense; rather, it is a power-conferring rule, with built-in limits to exercise
the power loyally.232 For this reason, the primary remedy for breaches of loyalty
is rescission. Tis is analogous to situations where one enters into compelled
agreements: A non-loyal exercise of judgment for the benefciary is fundamentally
fawed and incoherent, and prompts rescission.233
Te fduciary power and its requirement of loyalty are tied to two further
rules: the no-conficts rule, and the no-profts rule. Te no-conficts rule is as an
extension of the loyalty requirement. In situations of confict, it is impossible to
be certain that extraneous considerations—i.e., those negatively afecting loyal
judgment—have been excluded.234 Te no-conficts rule relates to the subjective
character of loyalty; compliance cannot be objectively determined by evaluating
the fduciary’s decision itself.235 In situations of confict, loyalty cannot be assured,
so fduciaries’ legal acts are voidable by benefciaries.236 Te no-profts rule,
fnally, permits benefciaries to strip profts from fduciaries gained through their
fduciary positions. According to Smith, recovery of profts is a rule of primary
attribution, not a secondary rule resulting from fduciary wrongdoing; it arises
from the fduciary relation itself, in which the fduciary receives all profts for the
benefciary.237 Again, this relates to the transfer of the benefciary’s autonomy
to the fduciary: Where the fduciary gains something through the fduciary
position—while acting for the benefciary—the gain is credited to the benefciary
as a primary right.238
Accordingly, the essential feature of the fduciary relation is the transfer of
discretionary decision-making power to the fduciary, along with the fduciary’s
subjective identifcation with the interests of the benefciary, as represented by the
230.
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requirement of loyalty. Fiduciary duties are intelligible in light of this juridical
relation: Tey ensure that the fduciary exercises discretionary decision-making
power for the benefciary, so that the fduciary’s decision can rightly be seen as the
benefciary’s decision. Terefore, if the agency relation—as a fduciary relation—
has a core meaning, it is the transfer of discretionary decision-making power
itself—i.e., the power to act for another—not the fduciary duties which support it.
Let us return to the pure legal agency account. AAs perform tasks for deployers
with functional independence. In this sense, AAs’ social role is analogous to that
of legal agents: AAs are instrumentally rational actors who act exclusively for
human or corporate purposes. Tey do not have their own subjective interests
that need to be restrained. Teir legal agency status is then intelligible without
being constituted by fduciary duties. In ordinary instances of legal agency, where
agents are legal persons with their own personal interests, fduciary duties are
necessary to constitute agency relations. In these instances, absent fduciary
duties, there is no assurance that agents will act exclusively for their principals,
subjectively identifying with their principals’ interests. However, since AAs do
not have subjective interests of their own, fduciary duties are redundant.
Admittedly, this is not a comprehensive treatment of the laws of agency.
To reiterate, in this article, the point of departure was tort law, and AAs’ pure legal
agency status relates specifcally to a theory of vicarious liability for AA-caused
harm, based on an analogy between AA deployment and human employment.
Te broader implications of AAs’ pure legal agency status fall beyond the scope
of this article. However, Smith’s conception of legal agency as a transfer of
discretionary decision-making power—the power to act for another—suggests
that agency has a core meaning that is applicable to AAs. Tis core insight ofers a
plausible theoretical foundation to ground vicarious liability for AA-caused harm
and is a point of entry toward a theory of pure legal agency.

V. CONCLUSION
Te doctrinal form of vicarious liability ofers a promising basis to ground
tort liability for AA-caused harm, upon which deployers are liable for tortious
harm caused by AAs in the course of deployment. In this view, AAs’ outward
efects are evaluated as tortious (or non-tortious), pursuant to a legal intentional
stance, alleviating the inefcient task of scrutinizing AAs’ emergent algorithms to
trace AAs’ harmful efects to tortious human agency. AAs’ tortious acts are then
attributed to deployers when committed in the course of deployment—that is,
when related to characteristic deployment risk. In this way, AAs resemble legal
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agents, empowered to trigger liability consequences for deployers. In particular,
AAs are pure legal agents without legal personhood.
AAs’ pure legal agency is coherent and sensible in the context of vicarious
liability, which implicates a broader deployment relation, and not AAs’ intrinsic
legal or moral character. Te pure legal agency classifcation captures AAs’
normative position within human relations as functionally independent and
rational instruments deployed to act exclusively for human purposes. Evaluating
AAs’ external behaviours as tortious is a surrogate for determining their deployers’
agent-specifc (vicarious) liability as a matter of tort law. Te pure legal agency
classifcation, in this respect, ofers a valuable strategy to promote pragmatic
liability outcomes for AA-caused harm, in accordance with tort’s doctrinal and
theoretical structure of corrective justice.

